Washington Law Review
Volume 92

Number 1

3-1-2017

Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical Study of the Federal
Circuit's Application of eBay
Ryan T. Holte
Christopher B. Seaman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical Study of the Federal
Circuit's Application of eBay, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 145 (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol92/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

09 - Holte Seaman.docx (Do Not Delete)

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

PATENT INJUNCTIONS ON APPEAL:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF EBAY
Ryan T. Holte* & Christopher B. Seaman**
Abstract: More than ten years after the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision
in eBay v. MercExchange, the availability of injunctive relief in patent cases remains hotly
contested. For example, in a recent decision in the long-running litigation between Apple and
Samsung, members of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit divided
sharply on whether an injunction was warranted to prevent Samsung from continuing to
infringe several smartphone features patented by Apple. To date, however, nearly all
empirical scholarship regarding eBay has focused on trial court decisions, rather than the
Federal Circuit.
This Article represents the first comprehensive empirical study of permanent injunction
decisions by the Federal Circuit following eBay. Through an original dataset on appeals from
almost 200 patent cases, we assess the impact of the Federal Circuit on the availability of
permanent injunctions. The findings from this study indicate the Federal Circuit is generally
more favorable to prevailing patentees regarding injunctive relief than the district courts
following eBay. District courts that grant an injunction after a finding of liability are highly
likely to be affirmed on appeal, whereas district courts that deny an injunction have a
statistically significant lower affirmance rate. This suggests the Federal Circuit is generally
inclined toward a property rule rather than a liability rule as a remedy against future patent
infringement. It also appears to lend support to claims by scholars and others that the Federal
Circuit, as a specialized court with a large number of patent cases, is more pro-patentee than
the generalist district courts. Finally, the implications of this and other empirical findings
from the study are considered.
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INTRODUCTION
Permanent injunctions are strong medicine in patent disputes. An
injunction allows the patent owner to exclude others from using or
practicing the patented technology without permission, under penalty of
contempt of court.1 When faced with the prospect of a court-ordered
injunction, “an infringer likely will be willing to settle the suit by paying

1. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 271(a) (2012) (preventing the infringer from making, using, selling,
offering to sell, or importing any product that infringes the patent).
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the patentee a higher price to practice the claimed invention,”2 often by
passing the price increase along to consumers.
Traditionally, nearly all patentees received a permanent injunction
after prevailing on liability.3 But the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay
v. MercExchange4 significantly changed this calculus, especially for
non-practicing patentees, sometimes referred to as “patent trolls.”5
Previous studies have found that after eBay, district courts “appear to
have adopted a de facto rule against injunctive relief” for non-practicing
patentees and other patent owners “who do not directly
compete . . . against an infringer” in a product market.6 This rule,
however, is in considerable tension with the Supreme Court’s holding
that the trial court in eBay “erred in its categorical denial of injunctive
relief” to a non-practicing patentee.7 In short, eBay has given lower
courts significantly more discretion in deciding when to grant or deny
injunctive relief in patent cases, and the district courts’ exercise of that
discretion may conflict with the Supreme Court’s admonition against
categorical rules regarding entitlement to an injunction.
Although district courts’ application of eBay has been widely
studied,8 the role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
2. Daniel C. Tucker, Note, We Can’t Stay This Way: Changing the Standard for Staying
Injunctions Pending Appeal After eBay, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1276, 1281 (2011).
3. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(“From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of
infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.”).
4. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
5. See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1983 fig.1, 1988 fig.3 (2016) (finding that injunctions
were granted 72.5% of the time after eBay, but only 16% of the time for PAEs); infra notes 92–93
and accompanying text (describing the patent troll label). This Article uses the acronym “PAE” to
refer to a patentee’s business model based primarily on the licensing and/or litigation of patents
rather than the development and manufacturing of products. See Seaman, supra, at 1952 n.8 and
accompanying text.
6. Seaman, supra note 5, at 1953; see also Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup,
the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) (finding that of all patentees,
“PAEs are least likely to obtain an injunction; they tend to succeed in their requests only when the
defendant fails to object”); Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 95,
111 (2012) (noting that non-practicing patentees “are hard pressed to get an injunction” after eBay).
7. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394; see also John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85
TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113–14 (2007) (asserting that “district courts’ post-eBay practice” of denying
injunctive relief to PAEs “may be in some tension with the Supreme Court’s warning against the
categorical denial of injunctive relief to broad classes of patent holders” (internal quotations
omitted)).
8. See generally Chien & Lemley, supra note 6 (analyzing 192 district court decisions posteBay); Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market
Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REV.
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Circuit—which decides nearly all appeals in patent cases—has been less
critically examined.9 Indeed, the Federal Circuit itself often appears to
be split regarding the appropriate circumstances for granting an
injunction. Some panel opinions stress that patents confer strong
“property rights” that are consistent with “granting injunctive
relief . . . in the vast majority of patent cases,”10 while other members of
the court caution that there is a “clear Supreme Court standard” against a
“general rule that a successful [patentee] is entitled to an injunction.”11
For instance, in a recent decision in the long-running, billion-dollar
patent litigation between technology titans Apple and Samsung, a
divided Federal Circuit panel sharply split over application of eBay’s
four-factor test to Apple’s patents covering several minor features
incorporated in various smartphones and tablet computers, writing three
different opinions on the issue.12 To date, however, no published

305 (2007) (studying 25 district court decisions post-eBay); Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic
Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v.
MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437 (2008) (evaluating 36 district court decisions post-eBay);
Ernest Grumbles III et al., The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical
Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Nov. 2009, at 25 (assessing 67 district
court decisions post-eBay); George M. Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement
in a Post-eBay World, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 559–60 (2008) (evaluating 38 district court
decisions post-eBay); Benjamin Peterson, Note, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193 (2008) (analyzing 33 district court decisions post-eBay); Seaman, supra
note 5 (empirically studying 218 district court decisions post-eBay); Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect:
Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent
Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67 (2009) (reviewing 68 district court decisions posteBay).
9. Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and Why: An Analysis of the
Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677, 717 (2015) (stating that “additional
comprehensive research into post-eBay injunction appeals at the Federal Circuit is needed”); see
also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 772 (2004) (“Unfortunately, it is difficult to test the concerns that
have been voiced about the [Federal Circuit] empirically, and few have tried.”).
10. Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (internal quotations
omitted); see also id. (affirming the district court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction because
“the analysis by the district court proceeds under the long tradition of equity practice granting
injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases” and because
“patent property rights are especially difficult to protect with solely monetary relief because a
calculating infringer may thus decide to risk a delayed payment to obtain use of valuable property
without the owner’s permission” (internal quotations omitted)).
11. Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Prost, J.,
concurring).
12. Compare Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 639–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding
that all four eBay factors weighed in favor of granting Apple a permanent injunction), and id. at
648–56 (Reyna, J., concurring) (agreeing that eBay warranted an injunction for Apple and further
reasoning that “infringement on the [patentee’s] right to exclude is an injury for which an injunction
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scholarship has attempted a comprehensive empirical study of Federal
Circuit decisions regarding permanent injunctions since eBay.
To fill this important gap in the literature, we conducted an original
study into Federal Circuit decisions in patent cases that reached a merits
decision regarding a permanent injunction at the trial court level for a
7½-year period following eBay.13 For this project, we coded appeals
from nearly 200 patent cases involving contested permanent injunction
decisions—representing all district court rulings on this issue during the
study’s time period—for numerous criteria, including the duration and
outcome of the appeal, panel composition, and the Federal Circuit’s
reasoning for affirming or overturning the lower court’s injunction
decision.14
The original dataset created for this study helps shed considerable
light on the Federal Circuit’s decision-making regarding permanent
injunctions in patent cases. Most notably, it finds a sharp and statistically
significant split in affirmance rates depending on whether the district
court granted or denied injunctive relief to the prevailing patentee.15
Specifically, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court when it
granted a permanent injunction nearly ninety percent of the time, but it
affirmed only slightly over half the time when the district court denied
an injunction.16 Furthermore, this finding was robust after controlling for
other variables, such as whether the patentee was a non-practicing entity,
whether the patentee and infringer were competitors, and the field of
technology of the infringed patents.17 Additional descriptive results also
reveal interesting patterns regarding the filing and pendency of Federal
Circuit appeals,18 as well as the voting patterns of individual Federal
Circuit judges regarding injunctive relief and citations to the two
concurring opinions in eBay.19
The balance of this Article is organized as follows. Part I first
provides an overview of the eBay litigation, including the 2006 Supreme

can be granted”), with id. at 656–63 (Prost, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]his is not a close case”
and contending that Apple failed to demonstrate irreparable harm).
13. See infra section II.B (describing the study design); Seaman, supra note 5, at 1975–76
(describing methods used to identify all patent cases involving a merits decision on permanent
injunctions at the trial court level from May 2006 through December 2013).
14. See infra notes 146–169 and accompanying text (describing variables coded).
15. See infra section III.A.5.
16. See infra section III.A.5 Figure 6.
17. See infra section III.A.7.
18. See infra sections III.A.1 & III.A.3.
19. See infra sections III.A.6 & III.A.8.
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Court decision. It then summarizes the theoretical distinction between
property rules and liability rules for enforcing patent rights and details
the results of previous empirical studies concerning district courts’
application of eBay. Next, it reviews the Federal Circuit’s central role in
harmonizing and shaping patent law. Part II describes the research
questions considered in this empirical study and the methodology used
to address them. Part III discusses the study’s findings and their
implications, as well as individual case details for the few Federal
Circuit cases where injunctions were denied by the district court and
affirmed on appeal, or injunctions were granted by the district court but
overturned by the Federal Circuit.
I.

BACKGROUND

To assist in evaluating the Federal Circuit’s role in patent injunctions
post-eBay, this section first discusses the history of eBay v.
MercExchange, including the parties, procedural history, and Supreme
Court decision. It then discusses the impact of eBay on district courts,
most notably the shift by district courts away from a property rule
approach for non-practicing patent owners. Finally, it reviews the
Federal Circuit’s role in harmonizing patent law as well as past
scholarship suggesting that the Federal Circuit may be more propatentee than district courts in its application of patent law.
A.

The eBay Decision and Its Impact

1.

The Parties and Lower Court Decisions

The eBay saga begins with the mid-1990’s founding of
MercExchange by former CIA engineer Tom Woolston.20
MercExchange’s business was initially directed towards collectible sales
via e-commerce, with the focus of its plans centered on Woolston’s 1995
patent application for trusted computer-based sales between parties
unaffiliated with one another.21 MercExchange’s dispute with eBay
started in 2000, when MercExchange began experiencing financial
20. Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 24 (2013) (citing Transcript of Record at 308–15, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay,
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. 2:01-CV-736)). Woolston’s company was first
named Fleanet, then it was changed to MercExchange during the time that the first patent
application was pending. Id. After founding Fleanet, Woolston received a law degree from the
George Washington University School of Law. Id.
21. U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995) (issued Dec. 1, 1998); Holte, supra note 20,
at 26–27.
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problems and eBay—prior to any alleged infringement—expressed
interest in purchasing MercExchange’s patent portfolio.22
After a few months of unsuccessful negotiation, MercExchange
believed that eBay was “looking for ways to kill the patents instead of
buying them.”23 The negotiations ended, and—according to
MercExchange—eBay then began infringing the Woolston patents.24
MercExchange then sued eBay for patent infringement in September
2001 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, where MercExchange was based.25
After a five-week trial in 2003, a jury found Woolston’s original ‘265
patent (and one other patent in the same family as the ‘265 patent) not
invalid and infringed, and it awarded MercExchange $35 million in
damages.26 MercExchange subsequently moved for entry of a permanent
injunction, which the district court denied.27 While recognizing “the
grant of injunctive relief against the infringer is considered the norm,”
the district court stated that it was required to consider “traditional
equitable principles,” including “(i) whether the plaintiff would face
irreparable injury if the injunction did not issue, (ii) whether the plaintiff
has an adequate remedy at law, (iii) whether granting the injunction is in
the public interest, and (iv) whether the balance of the hardships tips in
the plaintiff’s favor.”28
After evaluating these factors, the district court found none of them
weighed in favor of granting an injunction, placing particular emphasis
on evidence of MercExchange’s “willingness to license its patents, its
lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents, and its comments
to the media as to its intent with respect to enforcement of its patent
rights.”29 The district court ultimately concluded that eBay successfully
rebutted the presumption that MercExchange would suffer irreparable
harm absent an injunction.30

22. Holte, supra note 20, at 29.
23. Julia Wilkinson, The eBay Patent Wars: Interview with MercExchange CEO Thomas
Woolston (Sept. 30, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20160305045459/http://www.ecommerce
bytes. com/cab/abn/y04/m09 /i30/s01 [https://perma.cc/Y3VC-GYUJ].
24. Id.
25. Complaint for Patent Infringement, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695
(E.D. Va. 2003) (No. 2:01-CV-736).
26. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 698–99.
27. Id. at 710–15.
28. Id. at 711.
29. Id. at 712.
30. Id.
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Both MercExchange and eBay appealed to the Federal Circuit on
various grounds. The Federal Circuit issued a seventeen-page opinion in
March 2005, addressing the injunction issue in just over one page.31
Reversing the denial of a permanent injunction, the Federal Circuit did
not cite the four-factor equitable test applied by the district court.
Instead, the court began its analysis by declaring “the general rule is that
a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have
been adjudged.”32 It went on to state “a court may decline to enter an
injunction” only in unusual circumstances, such as “when ‘a patentee’s
failure to practice the patented invention frustrates an important public
need for the invention,’ such as . . . to protect public health.”33
The court then found that the district court erred in a number of areas.
First, regarding the district court’s concern over the issuance of
business-method patents, the Federal Circuit stated “[a] general concern
regarding business-method patents [ ] is not the type of important public
need that justifies the unusual step of denying injunctive relief.”34
Second, regarding MercExchange’s public statements describing its
willingness to license the patents at issue, the Federal Circuit stated
“[i]njunctions are not reserved for patentees who intend to practice their
patents . . . [i]f the injunction gives [MercExchange] additional leverage
in licensing, that is a natural consequence of the right to exclude . . . ”35
Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded its discussion of the injunction
issue by holding that “[w]e therefore see no reason to depart from the
general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”36
2.

The Supreme Court’s Decision and Concurring Opinions

eBay filed its petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court on
July 25, 2005,37 MercExchange filed an opposition,38 and on November

31. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
32. Id. at 1338 (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
33. Id. (quoting Rite–Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
34. Id. at 1339.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05130), 2005 WL 1801263.
38. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S.
388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2005 WL 2396812.
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28, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions.39 The
first question was whether the Federal Circuit erred in employing a
general rule of issuing a permanent injunction after a finding of
infringement.40 The second question was whether the Supreme Court
should “reconsider its precedents, including Continental Paper Bag Co.
v. Eastern Bag Company,”41 a 1908 case containing language requiring a
near-automatic injunction rule.42
On May 15, 2006, the Court unanimously reversed the Federal
Circuit.43 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for the Court. Chief
Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion (joined by Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg),44 as did Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter
and Breyer).45 The Court’s opinion is succinct—less than five full pages
in the official United States Reports—and holds that a federal court
considering whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing
plaintiff in a dispute arising under the Patent Act must apply “the fourfactor test historically employed by courts of equity.”46 The Supreme
39. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029 (2005) (granting writ of certiorari). The
Supreme Court did not invite the Solicitor General’s office “to file an amicus brief setting forth the
government’s views as to whether the Court should grant certiorari in” the case. “Such invitations,
which Supreme Court practitioners refer to as ‘Calls for Views of the Solicitor General’ or ‘CVSG’
orders, have been an accepted part of Supreme Court practice for about a half century.” John F.
Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518,
525 (2010).
40. eBay Inc., 546 U.S. 1029.
41. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
42. Id.at 429 (“From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his remedies. It
hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a
prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers
upon the patentee.”). The Court in Continental Paper Bag explained that the “no machine for
practical manufacturing purposes was ever constructed under the” patent-in-suit, and that the
patentee “locked up its patent” by “never attempt[ing] to make any practical use of it, either itself or
through licenses.” Id. at 427–28. In addition, it stated that “[w]e have no doubt that the complainant
stands in the common class of manufacturers who accumulate patents merely for the purpose of
protecting their general industries and shutting out competitors.” Id. at 428.
43. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
44. Id. at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
45. Id. at 395–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 390. Despite the Court’s language, some remedies scholars have argued that this
“historical” or “traditional” four-factor test for a permanent injunction was in fact neither historical
nor traditional. See DOUGLAS C. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 426 (4th ed. 2010) (arguing that there was “no traditional four-part test” and that the
Supreme Court majority’s citations supporting this test are misplaced in cases related to preliminary
injunctions); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v.
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007) (“Remedies specialists had never heard of the
four-point test.”). But see Rachel Janutis, The Supreme Court’s Unremarkable Decision in eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597, 597 (2010) (contending that “eBay is
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Court acknowledged that patents confer “‘the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention,’”47 but the
Federal Circuit failed to recite and apply “traditional equitable
principles” in deciding whether an injunction was warranted:
The [Federal Circuit] articulated a “general rule,” unique to
patent disputes, “that a permanent injunction will issue once
infringement and validity have been adjudged.” . . . Because we
conclude that neither [the Federal Circuit nor the district court]
correctly applied the traditional four-factor framework that
governs the award of injunctive relief, we vacate the judgment
of the Court of Appeals . . . .48
The unanimous opinion contained two notable points regarding how
courts should address these principles concerning to noncommercializing patentees like MercExchange.49 First, regarding the
district court’s rejection of an injunction based in part on
MercExchange’s “‘lack of commercial activity in practicing the
patent,’”50 the Court stated:
[T]raditional equitable principles do not permit such broad
classifications. For example, some patent holders, such as
university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably
prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to
secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market
themselves. Such patent holders may be able to satisfy the
traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for categorically
denying them the opportunity to do so.51
On this point, the Court concluded that the district court’s “analysis
cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress.”52
Second, the Court relied on its 1908 decision in Continental Paper Bag,
which held that courts can grant injunctive relief in favor of patent
holders who “unreasonably decline[] to use [their] patent,” in holding

not a remarkable break from equitable practice. Indeed, the principles outlined by the Court in its
decision are neither novel [n]or surprising when viewed in light of previous precedents.”).
47. eBay Inc., 394 U.S. at 392 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006)).
48. Id. at 393–94 (citations omitted).
49. Holte, supra note 9, at 700.
50. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 393.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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that the district court erred in categorically rejecting injunctive relief for
non-practicing patentees.53
Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion was only two paragraphs in
length and focused on the historical precedent of injunctions in patent
cases. After noting that the Court’s majority holding rested upon
traditional notions of equity, the Chief Justice went into a discussion of
that tradition vis-à-vis patent cases: since the early nineteenth century,
“courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in
the vast majority of patent cases.”54 In the Chief Justice’s opinion, this
traditional practice was not surprising “given the difficulty of protecting
a right to exclude through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to
use an invention against the patentee’s wishes.”55 Chief Justice Roberts
concluded the concurrence by citing Justice Holmes: “a page of history
is worth a volume of logic” regarding the long history of injunctive relief
in patent cases.56
Justice Kennedy’s three-paragraph concurring opinion57 first
supported the Court’s opinion regarding the “well-established, fourfactor test . . . in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief in patent
cases.”58 Second, Justice Kennedy agreed with Chief Justice Roberts
regarding the “lesson of the historical practice” in determining injunctive

53. Id. at 393–94. One author has previously argued the Court affirmed the Continental Paper
Bag case in eBay. See Holte, supra note 9, at 701 (noting that in regards to a non-practicing patent
holder, the Continental opinion states: “Standing alone, nonuse is no efficient reason for
withholding injunction. There are many reasons for non-use which, upon explanation, are
cogent . . . . Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the
patentee.”). Other commentators have argued that eBay’s generalities about equities stand in
significant tension with the argument and holding from Continental. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, The
Conceptual Relation Between IP Rights and Infringement Remedies, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825,
833 (2015).
54. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
55. Id. (emphasis in original).
56. Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)); see also Jay Dratler, Jr.,
eBay’s Practical Effect: Two Differing Visions, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 35, 43 (2008) (“The
thrust of [Roberts’] concurrence was that the results of permanent-injunction hearings in patent
cases need not change drastically as a result of the Court’s unanimous insistence on a four-factor
equitable analysis.”).
57. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy characterized the
concurrence as mere “observations” and only cited to a single authority to support his views—a
2003 FTC report summarizing a panel discussion concerning “The Rise of Non-Practicing Entities”
in the computer hardware industry. Id. (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38–39 (2003),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balancecompetition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY6M-MK7H]).
58. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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relief.59 However, Kennedy’s concurrence then sharply departed from
Roberts’; specifically, Justice Kennedy contended that “[b]oth the terms
of the Patent Act and the traditional view of injunctive relief accept that
the existence of a right to exclude does not dictate the remedy for a
violation of that right.”60 The opinion then asserted that modern patent
cases often differed from historical patent litigation in several important
ways, including the role of non-practicing patentees who employ
injunctive relief “as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”61 Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence also explained that injunctions may be
inappropriate “[w]hen the patented invention is but a small component
of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations.”62
Finally, it pointed to the “burgeoning number of patents over business
methods,” some of which allegedly suffered from “potential vagueness
and suspect validity,” as another reason to potentially deny injunctive
relief.63
3.

eBay After Remand and Its Legacy

While the landmark Supreme Court decision in eBay is fundamental
to the post-2006 changes in patent injunction jurisprudence, the
aftermath and conclusion of the eBay litigation itself also appears to
have played a significant role in the decision’s impact. Upon remand
from the Supreme Court, and applying the four-factor test mandated by
the Court’s decision, the district court again denied injunctive relief to
MercExchange.64 In a detailed written decision issued on July 27, 2007,
the district court again found that three of the four eBay equitable factors
weighed against granting MercExchange an injunction.65 The district
court’s decision after remand was the final injunction decision in the

59. Id. at 396.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id at 397.
63. Id.; see also Holte, supra note 9, at 703 (arguing that “given that the Kennedy concurrence
was self-described as ‘observations,’ the FTC report citation was simply a summary of testimony
related to an off subject discussion (computer hardware),” and that “[t]he briefing and oral argument
before the Court deeply considered injunctions for specific classes of patents, and the unanimous
Opinion of the Court explicitly affirmed Continental—the concurrence can truly only be considered
a general ‘observation’ by a minority of the Court, with no precedential value or citation intended”).
64. MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (E.D. Va. 2007).
65. Id. at 569–91.
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case and has been widely cited by district courts when applying eBay to
prevailing patentees in their courts.66
A detailed analysis of the district court’s reasoning on remand is
beyond this Article’s scope;67 however, an important point regarding the
court’s decision to again deny an injunction was its discussion critiquing
Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence68 and its multiple references to
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.69 Among other things, the district court
cited Justice Kennedy for the proposition that “[u]tilization of a ruling in
equity as a bargaining chip suggests both that such party never deserved
a ruling in equity and that money is all that such party truly seeks,
rendering monetary damages an adequate remedy in the first instance”
and that MercExchange’s “post-trial attempt to sell off its intellectual
property rights . . . . lessens the impact of [its] plea for equitable
relief.”70
Other district courts considering permanent injunctions in patent
infringement cases have regularly cited the district court’s post-remand
opinion in eBay and applied similar reasoning.71 In a previous article,
66. See Holte, supra note 9, at 730 (noting that “Judge Friedman’s second denial of the
injunction” after remand and MercExchange’s subsequent settlement left it as “the final opinion in
the case”). The district court’s opinion denying a permanent injunction after remand in eBay has
been cited in over 60 sixty subsequent district court decisions as of July 2016, most of which
involved permanent injunction requests. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
67. For further analysis of the district court’s 2007 decision, see Holte, supra note 9, at 706–14,
and Seaman, supra note 5, at 1967–68.
68. For instance, responding to the statement in Roberts’ concurrence that “a page of history is
worth a volume of logic” regarding permanent injunctions, the district court countered that “[t]he
factual history of this matter indicates that MercExchange has never sought to defend its right to
exclude,” suggesting that it was “merely seeking an injunction as a bargaining chip to increase the
bottom line.” MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
69. Id. at 574, 582, 586 (citing Kennedy’s concurring opinion four times); see also Holte, supra
note 9, at 711 (“Judge Friedman’s take on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was far more agreeable
[than Roberts’ concurrence], if not precedential.”); Rendleman, supra note 46, at 83 n.108 (“On
remand, . . . the trial judge rejected MercExchange’s renewed motion for a permanent injunction in
a detailed and factual patent-specific opinion influenced by Justice Kennedy’s injunction-skeptical
concurring opinion.”).
70. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Robert Reis, Rights and Remedies Post eBay v.
MercExchange—Deep Waters Stirred, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 133, 150–52 (2008)
(summarizing the district court’s decision after remand regarding the first two eBay factors and
citations to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence).
71. See, e.g., Open Text, S.A. v. Box, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 885, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Although
the ‘quantum of evidence’ required to prove irreparable harm is unclear, case law is clear that the
potential for loss of market share is insufficient.” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 577));
ePlus Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 459, 467 (E.D. Va. 2013) (noting the overlap
between the adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm factors in eBay (citing MercExchange,
500 F. Supp. 2d at 582)), vacated by 789 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v.

09 - Holte Seaman.docx (Do Not Delete)

158

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

[Vol. 92:145

Ryan Holte argued that district courts’ reliance on Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence as precedent resulted in a misinterpretation of eBay’s
holding.72 This issue was compounded by the February 2008 settlement
of the case before the Federal Circuit had opportunity to weigh in on the

Interlace Medical, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 (D. Mass. 2013) (explaining that the PTO’s
preliminary rejection of the patents during reexamination weakens the plaintiff’s ability to show
irreparable harm (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 575 n.15)); Layne Christensen Co. v.
Bro-Tech Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1117 (D. Kan. 2012) (noting that “irreparable harm had not
been shown in part because the patentee had consistently licensed the patent instead of engaging in
commercial activity in practicing the patent.” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71));
ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 641, 648 (E.D. Va. 2011)
(analogizing the patentee-in-suit to MercExchange, who both engaged in “‘a consistent course of
litigating or threatening litigation to obtain money damages’” and “‘utilized its patents as a sword to
extract money rather than as a shield to protect . . . its market-share, reputation, goodwill, or name
recognition’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 572)), denial of injunction rev’d, 694
F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Belden Techs., Inc. v. Superior Essex Commc’ns LP, 802 F. Supp. 2d
555, 578 (D. Del. 2011) (differentiating between entities who use third-party licensing to bring
concepts to market and those who “‘strategically utilize[e] a patent to excise a tax from companies
already participating in the market’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 583 n.24)); Metso
Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Intern. Distribution Ltd., 788 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(noting that “on remand from [the] Supreme Court, [the district court] declin[ed] to grant injunctive
relief where it appeared that the patent holder was ‘merely seeking an injunction as a bargaining
chip to increase the bottom line.’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 588)); ePlus, Inc. v.
Lawson Software, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-620, 2011 WL 2119410, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2011)
(explaining that the patentee must carry the burden of “demonstrat[ing] how and why its harm is
irreparable” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 577)); Enpat, Inc. v. Budnic, No. 6:11-CV86, 2011 WL 1196420, at *3 (M.D. Fl. Mar. 29, 2011) (“However, ‘the [c]ourt is not blind to the
reality that the nature of the right protected by a patent, the right to exclude, will frequently result in
a plaintiff successfully establishing irreparable harm in the wake of establishing validity and
infringement.’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 568)); Arlington Indus., Inc. v.
Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-0485, 2010 WL 817519, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010)
(stating that the public interest factor in eBay “typically ‘favors the patentee, given the public’s
interest in maintaining the integrity of the patent system’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d
at 586)); Joyal Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172, 2009 WL 512156, at *11
(D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009) (distinguishing the patentee-in-suit from entities like MercExchange “who
widely licensed their patents” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 569)); Trading Techs. Int’l,
Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 WL 4531371, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008) (“The eBay
district court, along with numerous other courts, has since decided that no presumption can exist
under relevant case law and the language of the Supreme Court’s decision.” (citing MercExchange,
500 F. Supp. 2d at 568)); see also Holte, supra note 9, at 722–23 (“Simply looking at citations to
Judge Friedman’s 2007 denial of MercExchange’s renewed motion for injunction reveals at least
thirteen citations within cases considering permanent injunctions for unrelated patent infringement
cases.”).
72. See Holte, supra note 9, at 721 (“In reviewing post-eBay injunction cases, many other
scholars have concluded ‘a review of post-eBay federal district court decisions shows that though it
is not the opinion of the Court, [Justice] Kennedy’s concurrence has proven to be highly
persuasive.’” (quoting Golden, supra note 6, at 2113 (“District courts have responded in apparent
lockstep to Justice Kennedy’s concerns about trolls.”)); LAYCOCK, supra note 46, at 427 (“The only
hint of what should have been the real issue in eBay comes in the penultimate paragraph of Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion.”).
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district court’s second injunction denial, thus leaving the post-remand
decision as the final public word on this issue.73
Another point of interest is the voluminous media coverage regarding
the eBay case,74 which was overwhelmingly anti-“patent troll.”75
According to an empirical study by Lisa Dolak and Blaine Bettinger,
press coverage of eBay coincided with the injunction appeal in the NTP
v. Research in Motion76 case from the same district,77 which threatened
to shut down Blackberry’s then-popular messaging service.78 Although it
is not possible to determine whether any members of the Court were
aware of or influenced by media coverage of the eBay or NTP cases, as
Dolak and Bettinger note, “that coverage . . . contained significant
discussion of particular considerations that were potentially relevant to
the resolution of the question at issue in eBay, and ultimately expressly
regarded as relevant by four of the Justices” in Kennedy’s concurrence.79
B.

Property Rules, Liability Rules, and District Courts’ Application of
eBay

Previous studies of eBay’s impact in the district courts suggest that it
has created a bifurcated regime of patent remedies, where some
patentees are generally awarded a property-rule remedy (via an
injunction against future infringement), while others are limited to a

73. See Holte, supra note 9, at 730 (“Should MercExchange not have settled before the Federal
Circuit had opportunity to reverse [the district court] a second time, perhaps the eBay Supreme
Court opinion might be interpreted differently . . . as opposed to an anti-patentee district court judge
having the final word.”).
74. See Lisa A. Dolak & Blaine T. Bettinger, eBay and the BlackBerry®: A Media Coverage
Case Study, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 12 (2008) (explaining that among patent-law related
articles in their dataset, “eBay received more coverage than any of the other Supreme Court cases
pending or decided during the [two-and-a-half year] study period”).
75. See Holte, supra note 9, at 703–06 (discussing press coverage of the eBay litigation). Cf.
Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions of Limine, and Patent Reform, 19 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 113, 127–33 (2015) (conducting an empirical study of mass media’s coverage of nonpracticing patentees and finding that “the term ‘patent troll’ is, by far, the most frequently used term
by the media” post-eBay). For further detail regarding the “patent troll” label, see infra notes 92–93
and accompanying text. This Article uses the acronym PAE (patent assertion entity) in lieu of patent
troll. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1952 & n.9.
76. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01-CV-767, 2003 WL 23100881 (E.D. Va. Aug.
5, 2003).
77. Dolak & Bettinger, supra note 74, at 13, 20–26.
78. NTP, Inc., 2003 WL 23100881 (granting permanent injunction to NTP but staying the
injunction pending appeal), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part and remanded, 418 F.3d
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
79. Dolak & Bettinger, supra note 74, at 31.
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liability rule (usually monetary compensation, such as an ongoing
royalty).
The distinction between property rules and liability rules for
enforcing legal rights (also called entitlements) traces back to Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s groundbreaking article, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.80
Under a property rule, an entitlement can only be taken or transferred
with the owner’s consent, which the owner is free to withhold.81 In
contrast, a liability rule exists when another party may violate an
entitlement if it is “willing to pay an objectively determined value for
it.”82 Thus, unlike a property rule, “a liability rule denies the holder of
the [entitlement] the power to exclude others.”83 Injunctive relief is the
primary means for enforcing a property rule, while monetary
compensation is normally granted for breaching a liability rule.84
Historically, prevailing patentees have been entitled to the propertyrule remedy of injunctive relief.85 As Chief Justice Roberts noted in a
80. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of The Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
81. See id. at 1105 (explaining that under a “property rule,” “[n]o one can take the
entitlement . . . unless the holder sells it willingly and at the price at which [the holder] subjectively
values the property”); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994) (“A property rule is a legal entitlement that can only be
infringed after bargaining with the entitlement holder.”).
82. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 80, at 1092.
83. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091, 2091 (1997).
84. See Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2150–51 (1997) (identifying injunctions with property rules and damages with
liability rules); Merges, supra note 81, at 2655 (explaining that “injunctions [are] the classic
instance of a property rule,” while “[u]nder a liability rule . . . a tribunal will determine the
appropriate compensation in an ex post proceeding”). As Calabresi and Melamed themselves note,
however, the categories of property rules and liability rules “are not . . . absolutely distinct.”
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 80, at 1092. For instance, if monetary remedies are sufficiently
high, they can operate like a property rule because potential takers of an entitlement would be
deterred from doing so due to the high cost. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1040–41 (1995)
(explaining that with “relatively high damages, potential takers would be deterred from
nonconsensual takings, and the entitlement would be transferred only by consensual agreement”);
Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train Wreck in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L. 1, 1 (2012) (explaining that “supracompensatory
remedies . . . can function as liability rules rather than property rules”).
85. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
255 (1994) (“Remedies for infringement of a patent are, with limited exceptions, those appropriate
for property. Injunctions . . . are available against infringers on proof of validity and
infringement.”); Merges, supra note 81, at 2662 (noting the “strong property rule baseline of
intellectual property law”).
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concurring opinion in eBay, “[f]rom at least the early 19th century,
courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in
the vast majority of patent cases.”86 Prior to eBay, the Federal Circuit
continued this practice, treating patents as conferring a strong property
right to exclude.87
Recently, however, some scholars and judges have argued in favor of
imposing liability rules for patent infringement, at least in certain
situations.88 These circumstances may include when transaction costs
would prevent the parties from reaching a mutually beneficial
agreement,89 or when a patent owner uses the prospect of injunctive
relief to extract compensation significantly in excess of the patent’s
economic value, a situation referred to as “holdup.”90
86. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
87. See, e.g., In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The patent right is a right to
exclude . . . . The essence of all property is the right to exclude, and the patent property right is
certainly not inconsequential.”); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (“The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of ‘property.’”).
88. See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under
some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction
may be appropriate.”); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex.
2006) (“[A] violation of the right to exclude does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that a patent
holder cannot be adequately compensated by remedies at law such as monetary damages . . . .”),
aff’d on other grounds, 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88
TEX. L. REV. 253, 256 (2009) (contending that “liability treatment for intellectual rights may be
preferable” in cases where the right to exclude is less important); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009) (proposing
adoption of a liability rule for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Mark A. Lemley &
Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 784
(2007) (arguing that liability rules are preferable when injunctive relief cannot be narrowly
tailored); see also eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that “legal
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve
the public interest” when “the patented invention is but a small component of the product” and
when “the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations”).
89. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 706 n.9 (1996) (“[L]egal scholars have interpreted Calabresi and
Melamed to be saying that property rules are more efficient when transaction costs are low.”);
Merges, supra note 81, at 2655 (“Ever since Calabresi and Melamed, transaction costs have
dominated the choice of the proper entitlement rule, with a liability rule being the entitlement of
choice when transaction costs are high.”).
90. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 26 (2011) (“An injunction’s ability to cause patent hold-up can
support withholding injunctive relief in some situations. A manufacturer’s high switching costs
combined with the threat of an injunction can allow a patent owner to obtain payments unrelated to
the economic value of its invention.”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-Up and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) (“[T]he threat of an injunction can enable a
patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent holder’s true economic
contribution.”). Other legal and economics scholars have questioned whether holdup is a significant
problem. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically
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Several prior empirical studies have sought to evaluate eBay’s impact
by reviewing district court decisions on permanent injunctions in patent
cases. Although these studies evaluated different time periods, they
generally agree that patent owners who prevail in litigation receive an
injunction (a property rule) about three-quarters of the time post-eBay.91
However, certain categories of patentees are much less successful at
obtaining injunctive relief, most notably “patent assertion entities”
(PAEs), which are firms that principally exploit their patents through
litigation and/or licensing rather than direct commercialization.92 These
previous studies show that PAEs—sometimes pejoratively called “patent
trolls”93—generally receive only monetary compensation (a liability
rule) instead of an injunction against future infringement.94

Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty
Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley &
Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714 (2008); see also Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross
Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 552–54,
570–72 (2015) (finding no empirical evidence to support the claim of holdup for standard-essential
patents).
91. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 6, at 9–10 & n.46 (reporting that “district courts . . . have
granted about 75% of requests for injunctions” from July 2006 to August 2011); Ellis et al., supra
note 8, at 441–42 n.35–36 (2008) (finding permanent injunctions awarded in 75% of district court
decisions from May 2006 through January 2008); Grumbles et al., supra note 8, at 25 (reporting that
permanent injunctions were awarded 72% of the time from May 2006 through May 2009); Petersen,
supra note 8, at 197–98 (reporting that permanent injunctions were granted in 24 of 33 (73%)
district court decisions from May 2006 through February 2008); Kirti Gupta & Jay P. Kesan,
Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases 7 tbl.2 (July 10, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (reporting that district courts granted 308 of 384 motions (80%) for
permanent injunctions from May 2006 through end of 2012); Docket Navigator, Success Rates for
Permanent Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange, DOCKET REP. (3:33 PM, Nov. 20, 2009),
http://docketreport.blogspot.com/2009/11/success-rates-for-permanent-injunction.html
[https://perma.cc/2F5E-AG85] (noting that 72% of motions seeking permanent injunction in patent
cases from January 2008 through May 2009 were granted in whole or in part).
92. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at 220 n.21 (“This report uses the term ‘patent assertion
entity’ [or PAE] . . . to refer to firms whose business model focuses on purchasing and asserting
patents.”); Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010) (explaining that PAEs
“are focused on the enforcement, rather than the active development or commercialization of their
patents”).
93. See, e.g., In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Plager, J., concurring) (“Patent
trolls are also known by a variety of other names: ‘patent assertion entities’ (PAEs), [and] ‘nonpracticing entities’ (NPEs).”); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-CV-03999-BLF, 2015
WL 4129193, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) (granting motion in limine prohibiting “derogatory”
references about the patentee’s business, including terms “patent troll” and “patent assertion
entity”); see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“Trolls, in the patois of the patent community, are entities that hold patents
for the primary purpose of enforcing them against alleged infringers, often exacting outsized
licensing fees on threat of litigation.”); cf. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., __ U.S. __, 135 S.

09 - Holte Seaman.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

PATENT INJUNCTIONS ON APPEAL

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

163

To further investigate eBay’s impact, co-author Christopher Seaman
conducted an empirical study of district court injunction decisions for a
7½-year period following the Supreme Court’s decision (May 2006–
December 2013).95 This study confirmed that while most patentees still
obtain injunctive relief, PAEs rarely do.96 This finding was statistically
significant, even after controlling for other potential confounding factors
like the field of technology of the infringed patent and the district court
that decided the injunction request.97 As a result, this study concluded
that “district courts appear to have adopted a de facto rule against
injunctive relief for PAEs and other patent owners who do not directly
compete . . . against an infringer”98—a rule which, ironically, is in
tension with the Court’s conclusion in eBay that “the District Court erred
in its categorical denial of injunctive relief” to a non-practicing
patentee.99
Although these prior studies shed significant light on district courts’
application of eBay, they necessarily paint an incomplete picture because
they are limited to only trial court decisions.100 The Federal Circuit, as
the sole appellate court for claims arising under the Patent Act,101 plays a
Ct. 1920, 1932 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court’s decision “increases the in
terrorem power of patent trolls”).
94. Chien & Lemley, supra note 6, at 10 (finding that district courts granted injunctions to PAEs
only 26% of the time, and only 7% of the time where the injunction request was contested by the
infringer); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at 256 (finding that “non-practicing
patentees have been less likely than practicing patentees to receive injunctions”).
95. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1975.
96. Id. at 1982–83 & fig.1, 1987–88 & fig.3 (finding injunctions were granted in 72.5% of district
court decisions after eBay, but only 16% of the time for PAEs).
97. Id. at 1996–98 & tbl.3 (finding that patentee’s status as PAE was statistically significant at the
5% level in the most predictive model, and noting that even this model “probably tend[s] to
underestimate the strength of the relationship between PAE status and injunctive relief” due to
collinearity with a similar variable).
98. Id. at 1953.
99. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); see also Mark P. Gergen, John
M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent
Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 244–45 (2012) (noting that although “[t]he Supreme Court’s
eBay opinion specifically indicated that courts should not adopt a ‘categorical rule’ denying
injunctions for nonpracticing entities . . . . commentators have reported that district courts’ actual
practice appears substantially to conform to the forbidden rule”); Golden, supra note 7, at 2113–14
(asserting that “district courts’ post-eBay practice” of denying injunctive relief to PAEs “may be in
some tension with the Supreme Court’s warning against the ‘categorical denial of injunctive relief’
to broad classes of patent holders”).
100. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1982 (noting that “this study is limited to district court
decisions; as a result, it does not consider the outcome of any appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or the reasoning by that court for its decision”).
101. 35 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
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central role in the shaping and application of patent law.102 It also serves
as the final arbiter in most patent cases, as the Supreme Court only
grants certiorari to, at best, a handful of patent cases each year.103 Thus,
to fully appreciate how eBay has impacted the traditional property rule
of injunctive relief for prevailing patentees, the Federal Circuit must be
considered as well. Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation and
application of eBay is highly relevant to the ongoing scholarly
conversation regarding the Supreme Court’s increasing involvement in
the field of patent law, which some have asserted is a response to the
Federal Circuit’s alleged favoring of strong patent rights.104
C.

The Role and Function of the Federal Circuit

The Federal Circuit’s role as the sole court of appeals in patent cases
and its function of overseeing the various general-jurisdiction trial courts
around the country are important reasons to study its jurisprudence
regarding injunctive relief. Indeed, during oral arguments at the United
States Supreme Court in eBay, Justice Ginsburg questioned eBay’s
counsel, Carter G. Phillips, stating: “One of the problems with the
district court exercising equitable discretion without a close review by
the Federal Circuit is just the thing that the Federal Circuit was created

102. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1791, 1795 (2013) (explaining that “the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit[] has an
enormous influence on patent law and innovation policy” due in part to its “near-exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals”); see also infra section I.C (discussing the origins of the Federal
Circuit and its intended role in harmonizing patent law).
103. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275–76 (noting that the Supreme Court “averaged barely one
patent decision per year” between 1950 and 1980, and that “[t]he Federal Circuit was created in part
because of the Supreme Court’s then decades-long neglect of the field” of patent law). Since 2000,
however, the Supreme Court has become considerably more active in patent disputes, issuing over
thirty merits decisions. Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION BLOG,
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html [https://perma.cc/RWB7-KBHK].
104. See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1416
(2016) (noting that many observers view the Supreme Court’s “significant[] increase[]” in “review
of patent decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . . as attempts by the
Supreme Court to rein in expansive Federal Circuit doctrine that has made it too easy to obtain
patents and unduly enhanced their power”). But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme
Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 76 (2013) (“One colorable explanation for the
Supreme Court’s activity [in patent law] is that the Court has acted to combat the Federal Circuit’s
pro-patent bias. That view of the Supreme court, however, is incomplete and ultimately
unpersuasive.”).
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to handle . . . the Federal Circuit is put there . . . so that you don’t have
wide disparities.”105
Prior to the Federal Circuit, there was “widespread perception that the
legal infrastructure of patent law was not being effectively managed.”106
The influential Hruska Commission Report on the federal appellate
system singled out patent law “as an area in which the application of the
law to the facts of a case often produces different outcomes in different
courtrooms in substantially similar cases.”107 Regional courts of appeal
had developed reputations as “pro-patent . . . and anti-patent,”108
resulting in widespread forum shopping by litigants in patent disputes.109
The Hruska Commission report concluded that the situation
“demean[ed] the entire judicial process and the patent system as well.”110
The 1982 Federal Courts Improvement Act created the Federal
Circuit to, among other things, “insure[] a more uniform interpretation of
the patent laws and thus contribut[e] meaningfully and positively to
predicting the strength of patents.”111 The adoption of a single tribunal
105. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006) (No. 05-130). A similar call for specialized courts came 100 years earlier from Judge
Learned Hand:
The court summons technical judges to whom technical questions are submitted and who can
intelligently pass upon the issues without blindly groping among testimony upon matters
wholly out of their ken. How long we shall continue to blunder along without the aid of
unpartisan and authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows;
but all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should
think, unite to effect some such advance.
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
106. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2004).
107. S. REP. NO. 97-295, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (citing SEN. ROMAN
L. HRUSKA ET AL., COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975)
[hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT]); see also Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift On A Sea Of
Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal
Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 531 n.35 (2004) (“The Hruska Commission’s findings ‘that patent cases
are inconsistently adjudicated’ were confirmed by the ‘great weight’ of testimony that Congress
heard in the 96th and 97th Congresses, including from ‘distinguished jurists, patent practitioners,
and representatives of major technologically-oriented business enterprises,’ testimony that ‘also
supported the basic objective of providing for uniformity of doctrinal development in the patent
area.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15)).
108. H.R. REP. NO. 97–312, at 20–21 (1982).
109. See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 107, at 220 (explaining that “the perceived
disparity in results in different circuits” in patent cases “leads to widespread forum shopping”).
110. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
111. Hearings on H.R. 6033, H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806 and H.R. 2414, Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.
797 (1980), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/gdoc/hearings/8/81602054/81602054_5.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PGA5-JUVL]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1982) (asserting that the Federal
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for patent appeals was intended to yield a “more predictable patent law
doctrine, reduce or eliminate forum shopping, and at least rationalize—if
not strengthen—the patent grant.”112 As Tim Holbrook has explained,
“[w]ith each decision, the Federal Circuit creates law at the national
level, a role previously reserved for the Supreme Court.”113 Accordingly,
since its commissioning, the Federal Circuit has served as “the manager
and developer of [] patent law.”114 In addition, some scholars have
argued that the Federal Circuit was established as “a ‘court with a
mission’” to not only adjudicate cases, but also “serve as a maker of
substantive patent policy” in the process.115 The Federal Circuit’s unique
role in shaping patent law has even led some members of the Supreme
Court to express concern “that th[is] specialized court may develop an
institutional bias” favoring patent owners.116
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has followed the Federal Circuit’s growth
and impact in a series of articles,117 and concluded that “observers
largely agree that . . . the Federal Circuit has vastly improved the patent
system.”118 In her view, the court has made patent law more “accurate,
precise, and coherent.”119 As a result, patents are likely more valuable

Circuit “will provide nationwide uniformity in patent law” and “make the rules applied in patent
litigation more predictable”). Cf. Lee, supra note 104, at 1438 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s
recent patent decisions may actually be working to curb “patent exceptionalism” by the Federal
Circuit and specifically noting that the eBay “opinion exhibits a systematizing tone that repudiates
any form of patent exceptionalism.”). In a strange twist of intent, however, the Supreme Court’s
attempts at generalizing patent law in eBay with a traditional test inadvertently created a unique rule
that was “developed for patent law [but] has become the standard for determining injunctions in a
wide range of doctrinal areas as opposed to vice versa.” Id. at 1439.
112. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 106, at 1115–16; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989)
(“According to proponents of the [Federal Courts Improvement Act], channeling patent cases into a
single appellate forum would create a stable, uniform law and would eliminate forum shopping.”).
113. Holbrook, supra note 104, at 62.
114. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 106, at 1116.
115. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 793–94 (2003)
(quoting Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elec., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123 (D. Mass. 2001)).
116. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 825, 838–39 (2002)
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining that “this generalist Court could
contribute to the important ongoing debate . . . as to whether the patent system, as currently
administered and enforced, adequately reflects the careful balance that the federal patent laws
embody” (internal quotations and modifications omitted)).
117. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of
Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787 (2008); Dreyfuss, supra note 9; Dreyfuss, supra note 112.
118. Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 800.
119. Dreyfuss, supra note 112, at 24.
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today than before 1982.120 While some commentators have asserted that
the centralization of patent law has led to “capture” by pro-patent
interests,121 “others argue that the apparent[] pro-patent shift has been
accompanied by a more restrictive approach to patent breadth.”122
In addition to this theoretical literature, numerous empirical studies
have examined the Federal Circuit’s role in shaping patent law since
1982.123 Although this empirical research is too extensive to summarize
120. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 25 (2d ed. 2001) (“The
[Federal Circuit] ushered in a new approach to patent validity and defenses to infringement,
resulting in a significant strengthening of the patent grant[‘s value]. . . .”); Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 106, at 1116 & n.37 (“It is widely perceived that patents are more valuable today than
before 1982. . . .”); cf. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 519 (2003) (“[I]ntellectual property has
become more valuable, and the number of patents, copyrights, and trademarks has increased
rapidly.”).
121. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 69 (2008) (citing various empirical
studies regarding the “pro-patent[ee] policies of the Federal Circuit”); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 104, 110 (2004)
(contending that the Federal Circuit has “significantly broadened patent-holders’ rights” and that it
has “systematically altered [patent law] in favor of the patent holders”); WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 335 (2003)
(“The Federal Circuit has indeed turned out to be a pro-patent court . . . .”); Stuart Minor Benjamin
& Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 17
(2008) (concluding that the Federal Circuit’s behavior in challenges to patent validity is “arguably
consistent with standard accounts of capture of regulatory processes by well-represented interest
groups”); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 822 (1988) (“Even with [the] safeguards [Congress imposed
when it created the Federal Circuit], the Federal Circuit appears to be a ‘pro-patent’ court.”); see
also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998) (concluding that findings of patent validity have been significantly
higher since the establishment of the Federal Circuit).
122. David R. Pekarek Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal Circuit Patent Precedent: An
Empirical Study of Institutional Authority and Intellectual Property Ideology, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
1177, 1183 (2012); see also John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 679 (2008)
(asserting that the Federal Circuit’s “apparently pro-patent shift appears to have been accompanied
by an effort to take a more restrictive approach to patent breadth. Under the Federal Circuit, patents
may be more likely to be issued and upheld, but they may also be more likely to have a relatively
narrow scope.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1112 (2003) (“[T]he [Federal Circuit] has clearly not
accepted the most assertive version of patents-as-ordinary-property claim, which counsels in favor
of broad grants.”).
123. For empirical scholarship regarding outcomes at the Federal Circuit generally, see, e.g.,
Donald R. Dunner, Introduction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—The
First Three Years, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1985); Donald R. Dunner, J. Michael Jakes & Jeffrey D.
Karceski, A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982–1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J.
151 (1995); Ted L. Field, “Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study, 46
U.S.F. L. REV. 721 (2012); Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the
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here, several studies are worth mentioning regarding the Federal
Circuit’s impact in strengthening patent rights and harmonizing patent
law.
First, an empirical study by Matthew Henry and John Turner used a
data set of patent litigation from 1953–2002 to compare appellate
decisions before and after the creation of the Federal Circuit.124 The
results of this study support the perception of “the ‘pro-patent’ nature”
of that court, at least with respect to decisions regarding patent
validity.125 Specifically, Henryand Turner found that the Federal Circuit
“has been signiﬁcantly more reluctant than its predecessors to aﬃrm
[district court] decisions of [patent] invalidity.”126 Further, “district
courts have ruled patents invalid signiﬁcantly less often” after the
Federal Circuit’s creation.127
Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL. STUD. 85 (2006); Kimberly A. Moore,
Judges, Juries and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365
(2000). For empirical scholarship regarding invalidity and unenforceability decisions by the Federal
Circuit, see, for example, John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in
Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745 (2000); Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness
and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911
(2007); Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study
of Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 369 (2011); Lee Petherbridge, Jason
Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84
S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (2011); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and
Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051 (2007);
Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709 (2013). For empirical scholarship regarding claim construction decisions
by the Federal Circuit, see, for example, J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference:
A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV.
1 (2013); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); David. L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical
Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); David
L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073 (2010); Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 106.
124. Henry & Turner, supra note 123, at 95. Henry & Turner identified 3,268 appeals decisions
from cases reported in the United States Patent Quarterly. Id. at 99–100. Of these appeals, 1,927
were issued by the regional circuit court of appeals, while 1,341 were issued by the Federal Circuit.
Id. at 100–01 & tbl.1.
125. Id. at 85. However, Henry & Turner also found that the Federal Circuit’s creation did not
result in a statistically significant change regarding the affirmance of non-infringement decisions.
Id. at 85, 112.
126. Id. at 85; see also id. at 112 (“The [Federal Circuit] has affirmed decisions of invalidity
significantly less often, [and] patentees have appealed decisions of invalidity significantly more
often . . . . ”). Cf. Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The Economics of a
Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411,
421 (2009) (finding the variance of the regional circuits’ validity rates in patent cases was six times
as large prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit).
127. Henry & Turner, supra note 123, at 112.
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Second, David Pekarek Krohn and Emerson Tiller compared citations
by district courts to appellate precedent in a random sample of copyright
and patent cases over an eight-year period.128 They found that “district
courts treat the Federal Circuit as more authoritative (compared to the
Supreme Court) on patent law than they treat the regional circuits
(compared to the Supreme Court) on copyright law.”129 In addition, they
found that “Federal Circuit[] precedent tends to be relied on more in propatent opinions than in anti-patent opinions.”130 From these findings,
Pekarek Krohn & Tiller conclude that “the Federal Circuit is succeeding
in its purpose of providing a set of patent law that is more authoritative
than is achieved by the regional circuits in similar areas.”131
II.

METHODOLOGY

This Part first describes the research questions sought to be addressed
through this empirical study of Federal Circuit appeals from district
court decisions on permanent injunctions following eBay. It then
explains the study design and collection process for the data and findings
reported in this Article. Finally, it describes some limitations of the data
collected.
A.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

As previously mentioned, the objective of this study is to evaluate
how the Federal Circuit applies eBay’s four-factor test in reviewing
district court decisions regarding permanent injunctions in patent cases.
In particular, it seeks to evaluate whether the Federal Circuit, as a
specialized court with expertise in patent law, is more likely to favor
prevailing patentees in awarding injunctive relief than generalized
district courts.
The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the Federal Circuit is
more pro-injunction than the district courts in applying eBay. In other
words, at the outset of this study, we expected that the Federal Circuit
would affirm district court decisions that granted a permanent injunction
to the patentee at a significantly higher rate than it affirmed district court
decisions that denied an injunction. The basis for this hypothesis is that,

128. Krohn & Tiller, supra note 122, at 1186–88 (randomly sampling 109 copyright opinions and
141 patent opinions from 2000–2007).
129. Id. at 1179.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1212.
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as a specialized court intended to strengthen patent rights,132 the Federal
Circuit is more likely to favor injunctions in lieu of monetary
compensation than the generalist trial courts because an injunction
provides greater protection for the patent owner against future
infringement.133
Several secondary hypotheses were also formulated. First, we
predicted that the majority of cases where the district court reached a
decision on the merits of an injunction would be appealed to the Federal
Circuit. This is because the cost of appeal in a patent case (consisting
primarily of attorney’s fees) is substantially lower than the cost of
litigating the case to judgment in the trial court.134 Second, we
anticipated that there would be substantial variation among Federal
Circuit judges regarding the application of injunctive relief after eBay
based on concurring and dissenting opinions by individual judges in
high-profile cases like Apple v. Motorola135 and Apple v. Samsung.136
Third, we expected that opinions by Federal Circuit judges affirming
injunctive relief would cite to Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion
in eBay, which suggested that the “long tradition of equity practice” and
“difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies”
would warrant injunctive relief in most patent cases.137 In contrast, we
expected that Federal Circuit opinions denying an injunction would cite
to Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which offered several reasons why
injunctive relief may not be warranted.138
In addition, we sought to study several other aspects of appeals in
patent cases that reached a merits decision on injunctive relief for which
we did not have a clear hypothesis. For instance, we intended to evaluate
whether appeal rates differed based on whether the trial court granted or
denied a permanent injunction, as well as whether the case involved a
PAE litigant. We also wanted to study the pendency of appellate
decisions by the Federal Circuit, as well as whether a stay of injunctive
132. See supra section I.C.
133. See Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v.
MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 35 (2009) (explaining that the “inclination to automatically
grant injunctions” prior to eBay “was in part motivated by an aversion to compulsory licensing,
which was perceived to favor infringers over patentees”).
134. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
135. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
136. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 809 F.3d 633, 662–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
137. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted); see also supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
138. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 57–63 and
accompanying text.
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relief was granted by either the district court or Federal Circuit. Finally,
we were interested in other potential patterns regarding injunctive relief
at the Federal Circuit.
B.

Study Design and Data Collection

An original dataset was created for this study.139 The starting point
was the dataset of post-eBay district court cases involving contested
permanent injunctions decisions previously created by co-author
Christopher Seaman.140 Using a variety of sources,141 Seaman’s study
identified 218 district court decisions on permanent injunctions in patent
cases from May 2006 through December 2013.142 These decisions were
then hand-coded for a variety of criteria, including the identity of the
parties, the district court that decided the injunction request, whether the
injunction was granted or denied, and other basic case information.143 In
addition, other information potentially relevant to the injunction
decision, such as the type of patentee, the technological field of the
asserted patent(s), and findings by the district court for each eBay factor
were coded as well.144 All of this information was imported into the
dataset created for this study.
The current study hand-coded several categories of information
regarding appeals for all patent cases included in Seaman’s district court
dataset.145 The first category of variables coded involved the filing and
pendency of any appeal to the Federal Circuit following the district
court’s decision regarding the merits of a permanent injunction.146 This
included whether a Notice of Appeal was filed by either party,147 the
139. The data collected for this study will be made publicly available upon the paper’s
publication. See Robin Feldman, Mark A. Lemley, Jonathan S. Masur & Arti K. Rai, Open Letter on
Ethical Norms in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 348 (2016)
(recommending that “data needed to replicate the results in a published empirical paper should be
made accessible to other academics at the time the paper is published”).
140. See generally Seaman, supra note 5.
141. Id. at 1975–76 & nn.171–76 (explaining the search methodology used to identify cases for
the district court dataset).
142. See id. app. A at 2006–18 (listing the decisions included in the district court dataset).
143. Id. at 1977 & nn.180–83.
144. Id. at 1977–78 & nn.184–92.
145. In addition, one recently-identified case that was not captured in the district court dataset,
but met the criteria for inclusion, was added for this study. See Edwards Lifesciences AG v.
CoreValve, Inc., No. 08-CV-00091, 2011 WL 446203 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2011), aff’d on liability but
denial of permanent injunction vacated and remanded, 699 F.3d 1305, 131416 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
146. Variable names are listed in brackets in the following footnotes.
147. This was coded as a binary variable: [appeal].
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docket number assigned to the appeal at the Federal Circuit,148 the start
and end dates of the appeal,149 the total time the appeal was pending
before the Federal Circuit,150 and whether a cross-appeal was filed by the
other party.151
The second category of variables coded related to the Federal
Circuit’s disposition of the appeal (if one was filed). This included
whether the Federal Circuit issued a decision regarding the appeal,152
whether the decision was a summary affirmance pursuant to Federal
Circuit Rule 36,153 whether the decision involved a three-judge panel or
was decided en banc,154 and citation information for the decision.155 The
identity of the Federal Circuit judges who participated in each decision
was coded as well.156 Finally, if an injunction was granted by the district
court, the district court and Federal Circuit dockets were studied to
ascertain whether either court granted a stay (temporary delay) of the
injunction.157
Next, each decision by the Federal Circuit was studied to ascertain
whether it involved a merits decision regarding the district court’s
decision to grant or deny a permanent injunction.158 Not all merits
decisions by the Federal Circuit reached the permanent injunction issue;

148. This was coded as a string variable: [cafcdocket]. If more than one party filed an appeal—a
not uncommon situation—then only the lead docket number was coded.
149. The start date of the appeal [appealstart] was coded based on the entry of the Notice of
Appeal in the district court docket. The end date of the appeal [appealend] was based on either (1)
the date the Federal Circuit issued its mandate or (2) the date the Federal Circuit’s mandate was
entered in the district court’s docket (the latter was preferred when available).
150. This was coded by calculating the difference in days between the start date of the appeal and
the end date of the appeal and storing the result as a new variable: [appealdays].
151. This was coded as a binary variable: [crossappeal].
152. This was coded as a binary variable: [cafcop_opinion].
153. See Fed. Cir. R. 36 (2016) (permitting the court to “enter a judgment of affirmance without
opinion” in certain circumstances). This was coded as a binary variable: [cafcop_rule36].
154. These were coded separately as binary variables: [panel_op] and [enbanc].
155. This was coded as a string variable: [appealcite].
156. The membership of each panel decision was coded in three variables, listed in the order that
appears in the published decision or order: [judge1], [judge2], and [judge3]. All of the cases that
reached a decision on the merits of injunctive relief were decided in three-judge panels; none were
decided en banc.
157. This information was coded as two separate binary variables, one for the district court’s
decision on whether to grant a stay [dc_stay] and another for the Federal Circuit’s decision on
whether to grant a stay [cafc_stay]. These were later combined into another variable that captured
whether a stay was entered by either court [stay_all].
158. This was coded as a binary variable: [merits_inj].
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indeed, most did not.159 This occurred, for example, when the Federal
Circuit overturned the trial court or jury on an issued related to liability,
such as claim construction, infringement, and/or an invalidity defense. In
such cases, the Federal Circuit typically vacated the entry of an
injunction if one had been granted without considering whether it should
have been granted under eBay.160 Thus, a Federal Circuit decision was
coded as involving a merits decision regarding a permanent injunction if
either: (1) the Federal Circuit’s written opinion discussed and reached a
substantive decision regarding the merits of the district court’s decision
to grant or deny a permanent injunction under eBay; or (2) the district
court had reached a merits decision regarding a permanent injunction
under eBay, and the Federal Circuit issued a summary affirmance of the
district court pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 36. Using these criteria, a
total of forty-two merits decisions by the Federal Circuit were identified
in the dataset.161
Finally, a number of additional variables were coded if the Federal
Circuit issued a decision regarding the merits of the district court’s
permanent injunction decision. These included whether the district
court’s decision regarding the award of a permanent injunction was
affirmed or not,162 whether the Federal Circuit’s decision cited to either
Chief Justice Roberts’ or Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in
eBay,163 whether the Federal Circuit’s decision discussed patents as

159. See infra section III.A.4 (noting that only 27% of decisions by the Federal Circuit reached
the merits of the district court’s injunction decision).
160. See, e.g., Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 1364, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing the jury’s verdict of infringement and vacating the permanent injunction
without discussing eBay); 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(same); Lexion Med., LLC v. Northgate Techs., Inc., 292 Fed. App’x 42 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacating
and remanding judgment of infringement based on incorrect claim construction and vacating
permanent injunction). One exception to this general practice occurred in Fresenius USA, Inc. v.
Baxter International, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009), where the Federal Circuit concluded that
“the district court performed the appropriate analysis required by eBay” and “the district court did
not abuse its discretion when it granted permanent injunctive relief,” but ultimately vacated the
injunction and remanded to the trial court “to revise or reconsider the injunction” in light of its
reversal of the district court’s grant of judgment as matter of law on two patents-in-suit. Id. at 1302–
03.
161. See infra section III.A.4.
162. This was coded as a binary variable: [affirm]. Any merits decision regarding a permanent
injunction that was anything other than an affirmance—including a reversal, a vacatur, or vacateand-remand—was coded as not affirmed. We also coded the disposition for each Federal Circuit
decision regarding injunctive relief using the more detailed categories described in LEE EPSTEIN &
ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH (2015), but the resulting
data was too granular for useful data analysis given the small number of cases.
163. These were coded as binary variables: [cafc_roberts_cite] and [cafcop_kennedy_cite].
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creating or conferring property rights on its owners (including the right
to exclude others),164 whether the Federal Circuit’s decision discussed
the fact that the patentee was a non-practicing entity,165 and the Federal
Circuit’s conclusion regarding each eBay factor if one was reached.166 In
addition, if a Federal Circuit judge issued a separate concurring or
dissenting opinion regarding injunctive relief, a dummy variable was
coded167 and a separate entry was created for this opinion.168 Finally, a
text field was created for any particularly interesting or significant
discussion regarding the case or the Federal Circuit’s reasoning on
injunctive relief.169
C.

Limitations

Before discussing the study’s findings, it is important to note several
potential limitations of the data collected.170 First, patent litigation is
often complex and frequently involves numerous issues, such as claim
construction, infringement (direct and indirect), various grounds for
invalidity, other defenses (such as inequitable conduct, exhaustion,
laches, and prosecution history estoppel), and remedies.171 Moreover, the
parties’ strategic objectives in litigation can vary as well.172 As a result,
it can be “difficult to make generalizations about patent litigation from
the study of individual cases.”173
Second, this study is based primarily on litigated court decisions,
which are subject to well-known selection effects. “[T]he selection effect

164. This was coded as a binary variable: [cafcop_prop_rights].
165. This was coded as a binary variable: [cafcop_discuss_npe].
166. These were coded as four separate binary variables: [cafcop_ebay_factor1],
[cafcop_ebay_factor2], [cafcop_ebay_factor3], and [cafcop_ebay_factor4]. If the Federal Circuit
did not discuss the merits of one or more eBay factors—for example, because it concluded that a
permanent injunction was not warranted because the patentee could not demonstrate irreparable
harm and thus reversed the district court on this factor alone—these values were left blank.
167. This variable is: [separate_op].
168. To avoid confusion during data analysis, a dummy variable called [court] was created to
represent whether the entry represented the decision of the Federal Circuit panel (either
unanimously or by majority vote) (coded as 1) or whether the entry represented the separate opinion
of an individual Federal Circuit judge (coded as 0).
169. This was coded as a string variable: [notes].
170. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1187 (2011) (“All projects involving empirical studies of legal
decisions have limitations”).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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refers to the proposition that the selection of tried cases is not a random
sample of the mass of underlying cases.”174 This is because “[c]ases only
go to trial when the parties substantially disagree on the predicted
outcome.”175 Thus, when the applicable legal standard clearly favors one
side, parties tend to settle their disputes rather than incur the expense of
litigation, which can be considerable.176 As a result, “the disputes
selected for litigation . . . will constitute neither a random nor a
representative sample.”177
Here, the cases studied are not representative of all patent disputes, or
even all patent infringement litigation, because each case must satisfy
several requirements. First, the case must have reached a decision on the
merits of the patentee’s claim of infringement. Like other forms of civil
litigation, the vast majority of patent cases settle before a decision on the
merits of the lawsuit are reached.178 Second, the patentee must have
prevailed on liability (i.e., infringement and validity if raised as a
defense), which occurs in a minority of all cases litigated to judgment. 179
Third, the prevailing patentee must seek a permanent injunction against
future infringement instead of monetary damages (such as an ongoing
royalty).180 Fourth, the losing infringer must have opposed the entry of

174. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Theodore
Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 337, 337 (1990)). For the seminal article on the “selection effect,” see generally
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984).
175. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1129.
176. The most recent edition of the AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey reports that median
litigation costs exceed $5 million in patent infringement suits where more than $25 million is at
stake. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37
(2015).
177. Priest & Klein, supra note 174, at 4.
178. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of
Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1780 (2014) (finding that greater than 90% of
patent lawsuits filed in 2008 and 2009 settle or are otherwise resolved without a decision on the
merits); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH U. L. REV. 237, 259
(2006).
179. See Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 178, at 1787–88, 1788 fig.5 (finding that
patentees prevailed in only 26% of cases litigated to final judgment that were filed in 2008 and
2009).
180. Gupta & Kesan, supra note 91, at 8 fig.2 (finding that the filing of permanent injunction
motions in patent cases decreased from 3.3% of all cases in 2000 to 0.6% in 2012). An increasing
number of patentees have sought a court-ordered ongoing royalty in lieu of a permanent injunction
against future infringement. See Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After
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an injunction.181 As a result, only a small fraction of patent cases filed
during the relevant time period meet are included in the dataset.182
Third, hand coding of appellate dockets and court decisions can
introduce bias or error. For example, if the coding instructions are
imprecise or include room for subjectivity, this could introduce errors
and negatively impact reproducibility.183 However, this concern can be
mitigated by creating, pilot-testing, and implementing written coding
rules that all coders must follow, as was done in this study.184 Another
potential concern is that court dockets in patent cases can be complicated
and difficult to understand, particularly for law students without any
prior experience in patent litigation.185 As a result, at least one coauthor—both of whom have substantial patent litigation experience prior
to joining the academy186—reviewed all initial coding decisions made by
student research assistants. When the reviewing co-author was uncertain
how a coding issue should be resolved, both co-authors reviewed the
issue and made a joint decision.
Fourth, the dataset contains a relatively small number of Federal
Circuit merits decisions regarding permanent injunctive relief. Although
the authors collected information regarding appeals in nearly 200 patent
cases, the Federal Circuit only reached a merits decision on the
injunction issue in 42 of those cases. This results in relatively low

eBay: An Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 203, 21618
(2015).
181. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1976 & n.174 (explaining why only contested injunction
decisions were included in the district court dataset).
182. Compare LEX MACHINA, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW 1 (2014) (stating that
over 25,000 patent cases were filed in the district courts from 20072014), with Seaman, supra note
5, at 1976, app. A at 200719 (listing 218 injunction decisions in the district court dataset).
183. Jason Rantanen, Empirical Analyses of Judicial Opinions: Methodology, Metrics and the
Federal Circuit, 49 CONN. L. REV. 227 (2016).
184. In empirical research, written coding instructions are preferred so that all coders apply the
same criteria for each coding decision. This helps promote consistency in coding and serves as “a
check against looking, consciously or not, for confirmation of predetermined positions.” Mark A.
Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63,
81 (2008); see also Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321, 325 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., 2005) (explaining that “the
overriding goal of a codebook is to minimize human judgment—to leave as little as possible to
interpretation”). The authors’ written coding instructions will be made available upon request.
185. See, e.g., Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 178, at 1774 (noting that coding of court
dockets and outcomes “in patent cases[] is notoriously difficult and time consuming, requiring deep
knowledge of patent law and litigation,” and therefore declining to use student coders).
186. Professor Seaman worked on patent litigation matters between 2005 and 2009 with the law
firm Sidley Austin LLP, and Professor Holte worked on patent litigation matters with the law firms
Finnegan and Jones Day for over four years.
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statistical power (although it represents the entire population of relevant
appeals decisions during the study period).187 It also increases the
possibility of a Type II error (i.e., false negative) in hypothesis testing.188
As a result, some traditional statistical tools, such as maximum
likelihood-based logistic regression analysis, were not employed.189
Instead, a descriptive approach was taken for hypotheses related to the
Federal Circuit’s reasoning for injunction decisions.190
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This Part presents the findings from analysis of the dataset and some
implications of these findings for patent law and litigation, as well as
innovation policy more generally.191 All data analysis was conducted
using Stata 14.1.192
A.

Findings

1.

Appeals Filed

A threshold issue studied was how often one or more parties filed an
appeal to the Federal Circuit. Since the bulk of litigation costs in patent
cases occur at the trial court level,193 a high percentage of cases

187. See generally JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988).
188. See, e.g., CATHERINE S. TAYLOR, VALIDITY AND VALIDATION 70 (2013) (“Low statistical
power occurs when the likelihood of Type II error is high, which can result from the use of a small
sample size and/or when the true effect size is small.”).
189. See generally Gary King & Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data, 9 POL.
ANALYSIS 137 (Spring 2001) (explaining the problems associated with using logistic regression for
rare events); see also Paul Allison, Logistic Regression for Rare Events, STAT. HORIZONS (Feb. 13,
2012), https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats3/RareEvents.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7MW-QX63]
(“[The] maximum likelihood estimation of the logistic model is well known to suffer from smallsample bias.”). Instead, a type of logistic regression for use with small sample sizes called exact
logistic regression was employed instead. See infra section III.A.7.
190. See infra sections III.A.8–9.
191. We did not analyze the Federal Circuit’s discussion of individual eBay factors due to the
small number of cases that reached a written decision on them. See supra note 161.
192. Stata 14.1, STATA DATA ANALYSIS AND STAT. SOFTWARE, http://www.stata.com/news/141/ [https://perma.cc/9HSP-8PZC].
193. See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 176, at 37–40 (finding that litigation costs
through end of discovery represented over half all litigation costs for patent cases involving $10
million and greater at issue); Meredith Addy, Appellate Strategy Before the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, in PATENT LITIGATION, NEGOTIATION, AND SETTLEMENT (Aspatore ed.,
2006) (“Generally, once a patent case has gone through a district court trial, it has already cost, on
average, $3 to $5 million, or more. Comparatively, the cost of appeal is far less . . . [and] almost
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involving injunction decisions were expected to be appealed. This
prediction turned out to be accurate; appeals were filed in 90% of cases
in the dataset (198 of 219 cases), as depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1:
Percentage of Cases Appealed to Federal Circuit

This figure is consistent with prior studies, which also show that the
vast majority of patent cases reaching a district court decision on the
merits are appealed.194 Interestingly, cases where the district court
denied an injunction were appealed at a slightly higher rate than cases
where courts granted an injunction, as shown in Table 1 below. This
difference was statistically significant.195

always exponentially less than the initial litigation. Furthermore, judgments in many patent trials are
in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Hence, the loser, naturally, wants to appeal.”).
194. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 18 fig.22
(2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigationstudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV9P-HR7T] (stating that 80% of district court cases decided at trial
between 2006 and 2013 were appealed to the Federal Circuit).
195. p = 0.013 using Pearson’s chi-square test.

09 - Holte Seaman.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

PATENT INJUNCTIONS ON APPEAL

179

Table 1:
Percentage of Cases Appealed to Federal Circuit:
By District Court Injunction Decision
Appeal Filed

District Court
Granted Injunction
88%
(138 of 158 cases)

District Court
Denied Injunction
98%
(60 of 61 cases)

Cases involving PAEs were also appealed to the Federal Circuit at a
slightly higher rate than all other cases, as shown in Table 2 below.
However, this difference was not statistically significant.196
Table 2:
Percentage of Cases Appealed to Federal Circuit: By PAE Status
Appeal Filed

Patentee Is PAE
100%
(25 of 25 cases)

Patentee Not PAE
89%
(173 of 194 cases)

Cross-appeals by the other party on one or more issues are relatively
common as well.197 As illustrated in Figure 2 below, when an appeal was
filed by one party, a cross-appeal was filed by the other party over 40%
of the time (84 of 198 cases). Again, this result was generally consistent
with other studies showing that a significant fraction, but less than a
majority, of appeals in patent cases involved a cross-appeal as well.198

196. p = 0.084 using Pearson’s chi-square test.
197. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (2016) (“If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or
within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”).
198. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 194, at 19 (showing that almost
30% of patent cases tried on the merits are appealed by both parties).
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Figure 2:
Percentage of Cross-Appeals to Federal Circuit
(Appealed Cases Only)

In addition, cross-appeals were more likely to be filed in cases where
the district court denied an injunction, as shown in Table 3 below. This
difference was statistically significant.199 In most of these cases, the
cross-appealing party—usually the prevailing patentee—contested the
district court’s decision not to grant an injunction.
Table 3:
Percentage of Cross-Appeals to Federal Circuit:
By District Court Injunction Decision (Appealed Cases Only)
Cross-Appeal
Filed

District Court
Granted Injunction
34%
(47 of 138 cases)

199. p < 0.001 using Pearson’s chi-square test.

District Court
Denied Injunction
62%
(37 of 60 cases)
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Stays of Injunctive Relief

Another topic studied was the frequency of stays of permanent
injunctions granted by courts. Ordinarily, a permanent injunction is
effective upon issuance, preventing the infringer from making, using,
selling, offering to sell, or importing any product that infringes the
patent.200 However, a court may delay the injunction’s implementation
by granting a stay. Stays may be granted by either the district court that
issued the injunction or by the Federal Circuit upon motion.201 To obtain
a stay, the moving party “must establish a strong likelihood of success
on the merits, or, failing that . . . demonstrate a substantial case on the
merits provided that the harm factors militate in its favor.”202 If granted,
the stay preserves the status quo by not enforcing the injunction for
either a fixed period of time or until the merits of the appeal are decided.
Staying an injunction may help reduce the holdup problem associated
with injunctions in patent cases.203 “[F]aced with the certainty of a courtordered injunction, an infringer likely will be willing to settle the suit by
paying the patentee a higher price to practice the claimed invention,”
often with the price increase passed along to consumers.204 But a stay
may help mitigate this situation by granting the infringer a limited time
period to implement a non-infringing design around with similar
functionality, while continuing to offer the infringing product or
service.205 The court may impose a royalty for infringing sales during the

200. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 271(a) (2012).
201. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c) (2016) (authorizing the district court to “suspend . . . an injunction
on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights”); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)
(permitting a party to move for a stay of injunction pending appeal); Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517
F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts possess broad equitable authority to modify
injunctions. This broad authority, coupled with the wide discretion to manage the order in which
they address issues pending before them, necessarily vests district courts with the authority to
extend the stay of an injunction. . . .”).
202. Aug. Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 395 F. App’x 692, 69293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Hilton
v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 778 (1987)).
203. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
204. Tucker, supra note 2, at 1281.
205. See, e.g., Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431 SBA, 2008
WL 928496, at *3–4, *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008) (delaying implementation of injunction by nine
months to permit infringer to seek FDA approval for a design around); see also Lemley & Shapiro,
supra note 90, at 203638. But see Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief:
Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMP. L. &
ECON. 571, 596 (2008) (contending that if “stays of injunctions [are] routinely
granted . . . this . . . policy would penalize the most valuable patents”).
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stay period.206 A stay may also be warranted when delaying
implementation of the injunction would promote the public interest, such
as ensuring the availability of products related to public health and
safety.207
As illustrated in Figure 3, courts granted stays less than one-quarter of
the time (24%, 38 of 158 cases) when the district court granted an
injunction. This included cases where the court delayed the injunction’s
implementation during a “sunset” period and awarded an ongoing
royalty instead.208
Figure 3:
Stays of Permanent Injunctions
(Injunction Granted by District Court Only)

206. See, e.g., ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 641
(E.D. Va. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 694 F.3d 1312, 1336–43 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (injunction
vacated and remanded for entry of ongoing royalty).
207. See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Interlace Med., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 69, 80 (D. Mass.
2013) (granting an injunction but staying its implementation pending appeal because “at least some
doctors and their patients will suffer a negative impact if [the infringer] is enjoined from selling its
medical device”); Nat’l Instruments Corp. v. Mathworks, Inc., No. 2:01-CV-11-TJW, 2003 WL
24049230, at *7 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2003) (staying an injunction for eighteen months because the
infringing product was used by automobile and airline manufacturers “when engineering safety
features for their products”).
208. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(explaining that the district court denied a motion to stay the permanent injunction, but allowed
continuing sales of infringing products pursuant to a mandatory royalty for a “sunset period” of
thirteen months).
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Of these cases, district courts granted a stay 28 times, the Federal
Circuit granted a stay 7 times, and in 3 cases both the district court and
the Federal Circuit concluded that a stay was warranted. Interestingly,
courts granted a stay of injunctive relief 75% of the time when a PAE
obtained an injunction (3 of 4 cases), and this difference was statistically
significant.209
3.

Appeal Pendency

Data was also collected on the duration of appeals. During fiscal years
2006–2015, the Federal Circuit reported a median time to disposition of
11.6 months for appeals from district courts that terminated after a
hearing (oral argument) or submission on the briefs.210 For the most
recent fiscal year (2015), the Federal Circuit reported a slightly higher
disposition time of 12.0 months for appeals from district courts.211
The median time to disposition for appeals for all cases included in
the dataset was 15.5 months. But this time varied substantially based on
whether the Federal Circuit ultimately issued a merits decision on the
appeal, either in a written opinion or through a Rule 36 summary
affirmance.212 As illustrated in Table 4 below, in cases where no merits
decision was issued—usually when the parties voluntarily dismissed the
209. p = 0.014 using Pearson’s chi-square; p = 0.04 using Fischer’s exact. Fischer’s exact
provides a better statistical test when there are small sample sizes. See Jenny V. Freeman and
Michael J. Campbell, The Analysis of Categorical Data: Fisher’s Exact Test, SCOPE (June 2007),
http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.43998!/file/tutorial-9-fishers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/29R7ZXNM].
210. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, MEDIAN TIME TO DISPOSITION IN CASES
TERMINATED AFTER HEARING OR SUBMISSION (2015), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/Median%20Disposition%20Time%20for%20Cases%20Terminated%20after%20Hearing%20o
r%20Submission%20%28Detailed%20table%20of%20data%202006-2015%29.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8ST6-YLFA]. The vast majority of appeals from district courts to the Federal Circuit involve
patent claims. Compare U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED IN MAJOR
ORIGINS (2015), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/appeals_filed
_in_major_origins_10-year_06-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7YH-DA5W] (showing that between 600
and 650 appeals from district courts were filed in FY15), with U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FED. CIRCUIT, FILINGS OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT APPEALS FROM THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
(2015), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Caseload%20Patent%20Infringement%20%
282006-2015%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH2P-ZU87].
211. MEDIAN TIME TO DISPOSITION IN CASES TERMINATED AFTER HEARING OR SUBMISSION,
supra note 210; see also GIBSON DUNN, FEDERAL CIRCUIT YEAR IN REVIEW FOR 2013 – 2014 3 & 5,
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Federal-Circuit-2013-2014-Year-in-Review
.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK2F-KUJL] (finding that average time from docketing to decision in district
court patent appeals was fourteen months for precedential cases, and the time from district court
decision to issuance of a Federal Circuit decision was seventeen months).
212. See FED. CIR. R. 36 (permitting the court to “enter a judgment of affirmance without
opinion” in certain circumstances).

09 - Holte Seaman.docx (Do Not Delete)

184

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:145

appeal pursuant to a settlement213—the median time to disposition was
9.6 months. In contrast, in cases involving a merits decision, the median
time to disposition (as measured by date of issuance of the Federal
Circuit’s mandate) was 16.2 months.
Table 4:
Median Appeals Pendency: By Merits Decision
Median
Months Pending

Federal Circuit:
No Merits Decision
9.6 months

Federal Circuit:
Merits Decision
16.2 months

Table 5 below reports the mean (average) duration of appeals for
cases in the dataset. The mean duration for all cases was 16.2 months.
Cases involving no merits decisions terminated in a mean time of 12.0
months, while cases involving a merits decision were disposed of in 17.3
months. These time periods are longer than the median duration due to
several outlier cases.214
Table 5:
Mean Appeals Pendency: By Merits Decision
Mean
Months Pending

Federal Circuit:
No Merits Decision
12.0 months

Federal Circuit:
Merits Decision
17.3 months

Figure 4 shows the distribution of appeal pendency for all cases in the
dataset where appeals were filed. It shows that the vast majority of
appeals are resolved in less than 800 days (slightly over two years).

213. See FED. CIR. R. 42(b).
214. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 498 F. App’x 986
(Fed. Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated sub nom., 500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir.
2013), and on reh’g en banc, 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, judgment vacated and
remanded sub nom., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., __ U.S. __,
135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
vacated, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (infringer filed bankruptcy during Federal Circuit appeal, resulting in stay of
case).
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Figure 4:
Appeal Pendency: Distribution

4.

Disposition of Appeal

The dataset also contains information regarding how often appeals of
patent cases that decided an injunction resulted in a merits decision on
appeal. Not all appeals result in a merits decision; some cases may be
appealed and later settled by the parties prior to a ruling. For example, a
losing party may file an appeal even though it believes it will likely be
unsuccessful in overturning the decision, hoping to negotiate a discount
(“haircut”) on the monetary judgment.215
Figure 5 below shows that most appeals for cases in the dataset result
in a decision on the merits on at least one issue (79%, 156 of 198 cases).
Only 21% of cases (42 of 198 cases) settled or were procedurally
dismissed prior to a merits decision by the Federal Circuit. Of the
appeals that did not settle or get dismissed, the Federal Circuit issued a
written opinion in the vast majority (89%, 139 of 157 cases), while the
remainder (11%, 17 of 156 cases) were decided by a Rule 36 summary
affirmance.

215. See J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 94 n.132 (2016) (noting that “[a] plaintiff often agrees to a haircut after the
verdict in order to avoid appeals”).

09 - Holte Seaman.docx (Do Not Delete)

186

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

[Vol. 92:145

Figure 5:
Disposition of Appeal (Any Issue)

The authors reviewed all cases appealed to the Federal Circuit that
resulted in a decision on the merits and classified 42 of them
(representing 27% of all merits decisions) as involving a decision
regarding the merits of the district court’s decision on a permanent
injunction. This included 25 cases where the Federal Circuit issued a
written opinion and all 17 cases where the Federal Circuit issued a Rule
36 summary affirmance.
5.

Affirmance Rates for Permanent Injunction Decisions

A central issue in this study is how often the Federal Circuit affirmed
district court decisions granting and denying a permanent injunction
post-eBay.216 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviews the district court’s
216. We initially hoped to compare the reversal rate by the Federal Circuit for injunction
decisions to prior empirical studies that evaluated reversal rates in Federal Circuit decisions more
generally. See Moore, supra note 123, at 397 (finding a reversal rate of 22% in patent cases
appealed to the Federal Circuit from district court judgments in 19931998); Field, supra note 123,
at 759 (finding a 25% reversal rate by the Federal Circuit in patent cases for issues reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard); Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43
Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1161, 1174–75 (2010) (finding a 21% reversal rate by the Federal Circuit for all
appealed issues from 20002007). However, in numerous cases, when the Federal Circuit decided
not to affirm the district court on its injunction decision—particularly when the district court denied
an injunction—the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded to the trial court, rather than granting a
reversal. See, e.g., WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (vacating
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decision regarding a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion,217 a
deferential standard of review.218 An abuse of discretion exists when the
trial court “made a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors
or exercised its discretion based upon an error of law or clearly
erroneous factual findings.”219
For cases involving a merits decision on injunctive relief, there was a
sharp split in affirmance rates by the Federal Circuit depending on
whether the district court granted or denied injunctive relief to the
prevailing patent owner. As shown in Figure 6, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction
88% of the time (22 of 25 cases),220 while it affirmed the district court’s
decision to deny injunctive relief only slightly over half of the time
(53%, 9 of 17 cases). This difference was statistically significant.221

permanent injunction and remanding to “the district court to conduct a more thorough analysis of
the eBay factors”); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 136873 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(vacating the district court’s finding that the patentee could not establish irreparable harm and
remanding); Whitserve LLC v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 3536 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(vacating the district court’s denial of an injunction and remanding to district court “to address the
propriety of prospective relief”); Presidio Components v. American Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d
1351, 136264 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that “the district court clearly erred in finding no
irreparable injury,” “vacat[ing] the district court’s denial of [patentee’s] motion for a permanent
injunction and remand[ing] for a re-weighing of the four [eBay] factors”). As a result, we could not
make an apples-to-apples comparison to reversal rates in these prior studies.
217. See, e.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing
Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
218. See, e.g., Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(noting that “[a]buse of discretion is a deferential standard of review”); see also Jonathan S. Masur
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 655 (“Appellate courts
also apply deferential review to many decisions that involve legal judgments of possible future
relevance, including . . . injunctions. . . .”).
219. Innogenetics, 512 F.3d at 1379 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
220. The cases that are counted as affirmance on the merits of injunctive relief includes Fresenius
USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (2009), where the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he
district court performed the appropriate analysis required by eBay” and concluded “that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it granted permanent injunctive relief.” Id. at 130203.
Despite this, the Federal Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded for reconsideration in light of
the fact that it reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law regarding two of the
patents-in-suit. Id. at 1303. As a result, the authors coded the cases as affirming the district court’s
conclusion that a permanent injunction was appropriate. Even if this case is counted as a nonaffirmance, however, the difference in affirmance rates is still statistically significant under both
Pearson’s chi-square test and Fisher’s exact test.
221. p = 0.011 using Pearson’s chi-square test; p = 0.015 using one-tailed Fisher’s exact test.
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Figure 6:
Affirmance Rates - Permanent Injunction Decisions
(All Merits Decisions)

88%
53%

In addition, there is a similar difference in affirmance rates between
cases where the district court granted and denied an injunction if
summary affirmances under Rule 36 are excluded (i.e., only written
decisions by the Federal Circuit are considered), as illustrated in Figure
7. For this subset of decisions, the Federal Circuit affirmed 77% of the
time when the district court granted a permanent injunction (10 of 13
cases), compared to only 33% of the time when the district court denied
a permanent injunction (4 of 12 cases). This difference remained
statistically significant.222

222. p = 0.028 using Pearson’s chi-square test; p = 0.036 using one-tailed Fisher’s exact test.
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Figure 7:
Affirmance Rates - Permanent Injunction Decisions
(Excluding Rule 36 Summary Affirmances)

77%

33%

6.

Injunction Decisions by Federal Circuit Judge

The study also coded all cases in the dataset for each Federal Circuit
judge’s decision regarding the merits of injunctive relief. This was done
to evaluate whether there were significant variations between members
of that court in reviewing injunction decisions.
A new variable was created to determine how often each Federal
Circuit judge was “pro-injunction.”223 A judge’s decision on the merits
of an injunction was classified as pro-injunction if either: (1) the judge
voted to affirm the lower court’s grant of a permanent injunction; or (2)
the judge voted to not affirm (i.e., reverse, vacate, and/or remand) the
lower court’s denial of a permanent injunction. In contrast, a judge’s
decision was classified as “anti-injunction” if either: (1) the judge voted
to affirm the lower court’s denial of a permanent injunction; or (2) the
judge voted to not affirm (i.e., reverse, vacate, and/or remand) the lower
court’s grant of a permanent injunction. If a judge’s decision differed
from the panel opinion—for example, by dissenting from the affirmance
of the denial of an injunction—then the judge was coded separately.
Rule 36 summary affirmances were included in this coding.
223. This variable is labeled in the dataset as [proinjunction].
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Table 6 below shows the pro-injunction rates for all Federal Circuit
judges who were active members of the court at some time between
2006 and 2015 and had at least five merits decisions on injunctive relief
in the dataset.224 It also shows the number of separate opinions (i.e.,
concurrences and dissents) authored by each judge regarding the
propriety of injunctive relief; these opinions indicate areas of
disagreement with the other members of the panel.
Table 6:
Percent Pro-Injunction Decisions, By Judge
Judge
Rader
O’Malley
Gajarsa
Prost
Dyk
Lourie
Mayer
Newman
Reyna
Moore
Linn
Bryson

ProN
Injunction
100%
10
89%
9
83%
12
80%
15
75%
8
Average: 71%
71%
7
71%
7
70%
10
60%
5
55%
11
50%
6
43%
7

Separate
Opinions
1
0
0
3
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1

Given the small number of merits decisions per judge, it is not
surprising that no Federal Circuit judge varied from the rest of the
court’s membership in a statistically significant way regarding injunctive
relief. The only judge who unanimously ruled in favor of injunctive
relief was former Chief Judge Randall Rader (10 for 10 decisions).225 As
224. Excluded from Table 6 are Judges Chen (1 decision), Clevenger (2 decisions), Friedman (1
decision), Hughes (0 decisions), Michel (2 decisions), Plager (2 decisions), Schall (2 decisions),
Stoll (0 decisions), Taranto (1 decision), and Wallach (4 decisions). Also excluded are district court
judges who sat by designation as a member of the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 (2012); they
are collectively classified in the dataset as Other (4 decisions).
225. Chief Judge Rader had a statistically significant difference from the rest of the Federal
Circuit using a simple multiple comparison test. p = 0.035 using Pearson’s chi-square; p = 0.034 for
Fisher’s exact. However, this result was not significant after imposing a multiple testing penalty
(Bonferroni correction). See MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS
211 (2d ed. 2011).
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explained in more detail below, Judge Rader’s pro-injunction decisions
are consistent with his characterization of patents as conferring a
property-like right to exclude on their owners.226
7.

Regression Analysis

As previously described, normal (maximum likelihood) logistic
regression analysis of the Federal Circuit’s merits decisions regarding
injunctive relief was not feasible due to the relatively small number of
such decisions in the dataset.227 Instead, an alternative methodology
suitable for use with small sample sizes called exact logistic regression
was employed.228
Three different models were construed for this analysis.229 In all three
models, the Federal Circuit’s affirmance of the district court was the
dependent variable.230 The first model (Model #1) used three
independent variables: whether the district court had granted or denied
an injunction;231 whether the patentee was a PAE;232 and whether the
patentee and infringer were competitors in a product market.233 The
latter two variables were imported from Christopher Seaman’s prior
study of district court decisions, which found that both were correlated
with injunction decisions at the district court level.234 The second model
(Model #2) added two more variables based on the field of technology of
the asserted patent: whether the patent involved software or computer

226. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 189 and sources cited therein.
228. See Cyrus R. Mehta & Nitin R. Patel, Exact Logistic Regression: Theory and Examples, in
14 STAT. IN MED. 2143 (1995) (describing the underlying theory for exact conditional inference).
229. These models did not include judge assignment as a control variable because Federal Circuit
judges are assigned to a representative cross-section of cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2012)
(authorizing the Federal Circuit to “determine by rule a procedure for the rotation of judges from
panel to panel to ensure that all of the judges sit on a representative cross section of the cases
heard”); Fed. Cir. R. 47.2(b) (“Assignment of cases to panels will be made so as to provide each
judge with a representative cross-section of the fields of law within the jurisdiction of the court.”).
Cf. Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignments in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015) (finding evidence of non-randomness in
panel assignments in some federal circuits, but not studying the Federal Circuit).
230. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (describing [affirm]).
231. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1977 n.182 (describing [injunction]).
232. See id. at 1988 n.243 (describing [pae]).
233. See id. at 1978 n.189 (2016) (describing [compete]).
234. See id. at 1988 fig.3, 1990 fig.4, 199698 tbl.3.
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electronics;235 and whether the patent involved a medical device.236 The
third model (Model #3) added one more variable: whether the district
court that decided the permanent injunction motion in the first instance
was the Eastern District of Texas,237 the district with the largest number
of new patent cases filed each year and a preferred forum for PAEs.238
The results of these three models are reported in Table 7 below. For
each independent variable, the odds ratio—which is a measure of the
strength of association between the independent variable and the
dependent variable239—is reported, along with the 95% confidence
interval in parentheses. An asterisk indicates statistical significance
(p < 0.05) for a variable. Finally, the model score reported by Stata is
reported in the final row.240

235. This was coded as a dummy (binary) variable: [software_electronics]. The “computer
software” and “electronics” technology categories from Seaman’s district court study were
combined to code for this variable. See id. at 1977 n.185.
236. This was coded as a dummy (binary) variable: [medicaldevice]. The “medical device”
technology category from Seaman’s district court study was used to code for this variable. See id.
237. This was coded as a dummy (binary) variable: [txed]. This information was derived from the
[district] variable in Seaman’s district court study. See id. at 1977 n.181.
238. See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 268 (2016)
(“Notably, the Eastern District of Texas is especially popular with patent assertion entities . . . .”);
Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the
Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193,
214 (2007) (finding that patent trolls “have shown a clear preference for the Eastern District [of
Texas] over other venues”); Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in
Patent Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 42–
43 tbl.1 (2010) (listing the Eastern District of Texas as the top forum for infringement suits by nonpracticing entities).
239. Odds ratios of greater than 1 indicate that the variable has a positive association with entry
of a permanent injunction, while odds ratios of less than 1 indicate the variable has a negative
relationship with entry of a permanent injunction. The amount by which the odds ratio is more or
less than 1 reveals the magnitude of the association between the independent variable and the
injunction decision. All odds ratios are reported to two decimal places. See FAQ: How Do I
Interpret Odds Ratios in Logistic Regression?, UCLA INST. FOR DIGITAL RESEARCH AND EDUC.,
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/odds_ratio.htm [https://perma.cc/B7G5-74RT].
240. The test of the overall model is a chi-square score, called “model score.” See Stata Data
Analysis
Examples,
UCLA
INST.
FOR
DIGITAL
RESEARCH
AND
EDUC.,
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/exlogit.htm [https://perma.cc/J8TQ-GH7Z]. Higher values
indicate better goodness-of-fit.
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Table 7:
Exact Logistic Regression
Variable

injunction
pae
compete
software_
electronics
medicaldevice
txed

Odds Ratio
(95% Confidence Interval)
Model #1
Model #2
6.58*
8.57*
(1.14 – 51.78)
(1.38 – 74.27)
.79
1.09
(.03 – 72.9)
(.03 – 121.49)
.94
.46
(.02 – 6.4)
(.02 – 6.48)
1.25
(.12 – 14.47)
6.11
(.44 – 398.74)
-

Model #3
7.59*
(1.20 – 66.37)
.79
(.01 – 112.18)
.38
(.01 – 5.70)
1.16
(.11 – 13.57)
4.58
(.31 – 304.84)
.88
(.09 – +∞)
[median unbiased
estimate]

Model Score

6.62

9.36

10.29

In all three models, the district court’s decision whether to grant a
permanent injunction is positively correlated with the Federal Circuit’s
decision whether to affirm the lower court’s decision on this issue, and
this correlation is statistically significant.241 None of the other variables
have a statistically significant relationship with Federal Circuit
injunction decisions, a result that was surprising in light of the prior
district court study.
8.

Content Analysis of Federal Circuit Injunction Decisions

To further investigate the Federal Circuit’s behavior for its decisions
regarding injunctive relief, we engaged in content analysis of the written
Federal Circuit opinions in the dataset that reached a merits decision on
a permanent injunction.242 This content analysis focused on two things:
(1) discussion by the court regarding patents as conferring a property-

241. Model #1: p = 0.032; Model #2: p = 0.016; Model #3: p = 0.027.
242. See generally Hall & Wright, supra note 184 (explaining content analysis of judicial
opinions as a form of empirical legal research).
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based right to exclude on their owners; and (2) citations to Chief Justice
Roberts’ and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in eBay.
As previously discussed, based on prior studies, the authors
hypothesized that Federal Circuit opinions favoring injunctive relief
would tend to cite Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in eBay, while
opinions that disfavored injunctive relief would cite Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence instead.243 In addition, opinions favoring injunctive relief
were anticipated to refer to patents as property rights that conferred a
right to exclude on their owners.244
After coding, seven Federal Circuit opinions in the dataset were found
to discuss patents as conferring a property right,245 three of which also
cited Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in eBay.246 In all of these
opinions, the Federal Circuit reached a pro-injunction outcome—
namely, it either affirmed the district court’s grant of a permanent
injunction,247 or it overturned a district court’s denial of a permanent
injunction.248 Interestingly, four of these opinions emphasizing patents
as creating property rights were authored by former Chief Judge
Rader.249 In addition, current Chief Judge Prost authored opinions in two
of these cases that appeared to disagree with the notion that patents

243. See Holte, supra note 9, at 721 (“In reviewing post-eBay injunction cases, many other
scholars have concluded ‘a review of post-eBay federal district court decisions shows that though it
is not the opinion of the Court, [Justice] Kennedy’s concurrence has proven to be highly
persuasive.’” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); supra notes 13738.
244. See supra note 137.
245. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Broadcom Corp. v.
Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers
Products Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech.
Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve,
Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142,
1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
246. Broadcom, 732 F.3d at 1338; Presidio Components, 702 F.3d at 1362; Robert Bosch, 659
F.3d at 1149. There was also a fourth opinion citing Chief Justice Roberts, but only in a footnote
discussing the district court’s likely reasoning. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582
F.3d 1288, 1302 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Read in context, the ‘all but inevitable’ statement does not
amount to legal error, particularly in light of the fact that the district court applied the correct fourfactor test and explained its analysis. The district court was likely merely acknowledging, as did
Chief Justice Roberts in eBay, that ‘courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of
infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.’” (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring))).
247. Broadcom, 732 F.3d at 1338; Acumed, 551 F.3d at 1327–31.
248. Apple, 735 F.3d at 1363; Douglas Dynamics, 717 F.3d at 1345; Presidio Components, 702
F.3d at 1362–63; Edwards Lifesciences, 699 F.3d at 1314–16; Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1149.
249. Broadcom, 732 F.3d 1325; Douglas Dynamics, 717 F.3d 1336; Presidio Components, 702
F.3d 1351; Edwards Lifesciences, 699 F.3d 1305.
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generally confer the right to exclude through an injunction.250 As a
result, there appears to be differing views among some members of the
Federal Circuit regarding property versus liability rule remedies in
patent infringement cases.251
Only two Federal Circuit merits opinions on injunctive relief cited to
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay, and contrary to
expectations, both of these decisions reached a pro-injunction outcome.
In one of these cases, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court
abused its discretion in holding that the patentee did not satisfy the first
two eBay factors.252 In the second case, the court reversed the district
court’s denial of a permanent injunction, citing to Kennedy’s opinion
only to distinguish the facts of that case from situations where Justice
Kennedy suggested that injunctive relief might be inappropriate.253 This
250. See Apple, 735 F.3d at 1363 (“Apple argues that . . . the plaintiff has a ‘property right
granting the plaintiff the right to exclude’ . . . However, as the Supreme Court made clear in eBay,
‘the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right.’”);
Edwards Lifesciences, 699 F.3d at 1316–17 (Prost, J., concurring) (“To the extent that one reads this
statement as creating the presumption of an injunction once the plaintiff prevails, which must be
rebutted by the defendant, that is not the law . . . eBay made clear that there is no general rule that a
successful plaintiff is entitled to an injunction; rather, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
the four equitable factors that weigh in its favor in order to obtain a permanent injunction. We
should take care to avoid possible misinterpretation of an otherwise clear Supreme Court
standard.”); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 809 F.3d 633, 662–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Prost,
C.J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s conclusion that an injunction should issue, citing
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay and stating “[f]or the same reason, the statutory right to
exclude should not categorically bias the public interest factor ‘strongly’ in the determination of the
injunctive remedies as the majority asserts.” (emphasis in original)).
251. This conclusion has also been noted by other scholars. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1111–
12 (2003) (“These statistical and doctrinal shifts, coupled with scattered commentary from
particular Federal Circuit judges, suggest that at least some members of the Federal Circuit view
patents rights as a relatively unalloyed good, comparable to rights in tangible property.”).
252. See Apple, 735 F.3d at 1372–73 (“Apple’s requested injunction relative to the scope of the
patented features and the prospect that an injunction would have the effect of depriving the public of
access to a large number of non-infringing features.” (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
253. The Federal Circuit reasoned in Robert Bosch as follows:
Although eBay abolishes our general rule that an injunction normally will issue when a patent
is found to have been valid and infringed . . . it does not follow that courts should entirely
ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to
exclude. Indeed, this right has its roots in the Constitution, as the Intellectual Property Clause
of the Constitution itself refers to inventors’ “exclusive Right to their
respective . . . [d]iscoveries. . . .” “Discretion is not whim, and limiting discretion according to
legal standards helps promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided
alike.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. at 395 (2006) (Roberts, J., concurring)
(quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139, 126 S.Ct. 704, 163 L.Ed.2d 547
(2005)). In this area, as others, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic” when “it comes
to discerning and applying those standards.” Id. (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)). This wisdom is particularly apt in traditional cases, such as
this, where the patentee and adjudged infringer both practice the patented technology. See id. at
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is in clear contrast to the impact Justice Kennedy’s concurrence has had
in district courts, where it has been frequently cited to deny injunctive
relief, particularly in cases involving PAEs.254
9.

Minority Case Details

Finally, in light of the small number of cases where a district court’s
denial of an injunction was affirmed by the Federal Circuit,255 or, even
more scarce, where a district court’s grant of an injunction was not
affirmed,256 descriptive detail on these cases may shed some additional
light on instances where the Federal Circuit concludes that injunctive
relief is not appropriate.
For the nine cases since eBay where the Federal Circuit affirmed a
district court injunction denial, an important first observation is that four
of these cases concern medical device technology.257 Of the five nonmedical device cases, three were Rule 36 summary affirmances,258 and
one case concerned a unique cross-appeal between Apple and
Motorola.259 There, the court (with two separate opinions) reversed the
denial of an injunction to Apple while affirming the injunction denial as

396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (contrasting the relevant considerations in traditional patent
infringement actions with certain cases arising now “in which firms use patents not as a basis
for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees,” “[w]hen
the patented invention is but a small component of the product,” and those involving “the
burgeoning number of patents over business methods”).
659 F.3d at 1149–50 (citations in original) (internal citation omitted).
254. See Holte, supra note 9, at 721–22 (discussing the reliance by many district courts on Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay and its general disapproval of PAEs).
255. The Federal Circuit affirmed injunction denials in nine cases: Hypoxico Inc. v. Colorado
Altitude Training LLC, 608 F. App’x 946 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Motorola as patentee); Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Applied Med.
Resources Corp., 579 F. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Valeant Int’l Bermuda v. Actavis, Inc., 534
F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670
F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Emcore Corp. v. Optium Corp., 408 F. App’x 355 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., LLC v. Worldport Commc’ns, Inc., 302 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
256. The Federal Circuit reversed district court injunction grants in three cases: ActiveVideo
Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Innogenetics, N.V. v.
Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 258 F. App’x
318 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
257. Hypoxico, 608 F. App’x 946; Tyco Healthcare, 579 F. App’x 1005; Bard, 670 F.3d 1171;
Voda, 536 F.3d 1311.
258. Valeant, 534 F. App’x 999; Emcore, 408 F. App’x 355; Cygnus Telecomms., 302 F. App’x
921.
259. Apple, 757 F.3d 1286.
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to Motorola’s FRAND-pledged patents.260 The final case concerned a
procedural challenge after an injunction was originally granted by the
district court and affirmed by the Federal Circuit pre-eBay, but the
injunction was later dissolved by the district court after eBay.261

260. At the district court, Apple filed a complaint against Motorola for infringement of three
patents, and Motorola counterclaimed, alleging that Apple infringed six of Motorola’s own patents.
Id. at 1294. The district court, based largely on its claim construction decisions, granted summary
judgment that neither party was entitled to damages or an injunction and dismissed all claims with
prejudice before trial. Id. On appeal, the parties contested the district court’s claim construction,
admissibility, damages, and injunction decisions for three Apple and three Motorola patents. Id. The
Federal Circuit affirmed a majority of the district court’s claim construction decisions with the
exception of certain “heuristic” claim limitations, id. at 1294–1313, and reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgement of no damages for infringement of Apple’s patents. Id. at 1313–22,
1327–30. Based on its reversal of the district court’s construction of the “heuristic” limitations, the
court also vacated the grant of summary judgment denying Apple’s request for an injunction. Id. at
1330–31.
Regarding Motorola’s claims, the court affirmed the district court’s decision that Motorola was
not entitled to an injunction for infringement of its FRAND (fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory) committed patent. Id. at 1331–32. The court noted, however, that to the extent
the district court applied a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for any standard-essential
patents, it erred, explaining that it saw no reason to create a separate rule or analytical framework
for addressing injunctions for FRAND-committed patents. Id. Rather, the court held that “[t]he
framework laid out by the Supreme Court in eBay, as interpreted by subsequent decisions of this
court, provides ample strength and flexibility for addressing the unique aspects of FRAND
committed patents and industry standards in general.” Id. at 1332.
Chief Judge Rader dissented as to the portion of the court’s opinion affirming the district court’s
denial of Motorola’s request for an injunction finding that the district court did not develop the facts
necessary to apply eBay as it should have and, thus, the case should be remanded. Id. at 1332–34
(Rader, C.J., dissenting in part). Judge Prost dissented with respect to the majority’s decision to
vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment regarding Apple’s request for an injunction.
Judge Prost agreed with the district court that Apple could not show that Motorola’s infringement
caused it irreparable harm and, thus, would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
no injunctive relief. Id. at 1340–42 (Prost, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The judge
also agreed with the panel decision that Motorola should not receive an injunction. Id. at 1342–43.
261. This appeal involved an original district court injunction-grant that was previously affirmed
by the Federal Circuit. Amado, 517 F.3d at 1356 (citing Amado v. Microsoft Corp, 185 F. App’x
953 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). After remand from the first appeal, the district court dissolved the injunction
in light of the Court’s recent decision in eBay. Id. at 1359. Appealing this order, the patentee argued
that because the eBay decision was handed down before [the Federal Circuit] decision in
Amado I, albeit after the completion of briefing, and because the permanent injunction was
included within [the Federal Circuit] mandate in Amado I, the mandate rule foreclosed
Microsoft from challenging the injunction or the district court from modifying it.
Id. Microsoft argued that “the propriety of the permanent injunction was not at issue in the first
appeal, and thus was outside the scope of the [Federal Circuit’s] mandate. Alternatively, it argue[d]
that eBay is an intervening decision and is thus an exception to the mandate rule.” Id.
The Federal Circuit held that “the district court was well within its discretion in this case to
reconsider the prospective application of the permanent injunction on remand in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay.” Id. at 1361. It also concluded that “the district court’s ultimate
decision to dissolve the injunction was not an abuse of discretion, when, after applying the
traditional four-factor test, it determined that an injunction was no longer equitable under the
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Turning to the four medical device cases where the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of an injunction, two of the four were
Rule 36 summary affirmances.262 Of the remaining two cases, both
opinions were authored by Judge Gajarsa. One opinion held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in relying heavily on the public
interest eBay factor to deny injunctive relief,263 and the second
concluded that “[n]othing in eBay eliminates the requirement that the
party seeking a permanent injunction must show that ‘it has suffered an
irreparable injury.’”264 Accordingly, “monetary damages were adequate
to compensate [the patentee.]”265
Finally, reviewing the cases where the Federal Circuit did not affirm a
district court injunction grant, all three opinions were authored by Judge
Moore.266 In MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels,267 the court concluded that
“the district court’s injunction is overly broad and therefore an abuse of
discretion” and reversed.268 In Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs,269 the
court went through a lengthy discussion regarding the jury’s reasonable
royalty calculation and found error with the district court issuing an
injunction after the patentee had already been awarded damages that
included future sales; accordingly, the injunction grant was reversed.270
Finally, in ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,271 the

circumstances.” Id. While the Federal Circuit did not analyze any of the eBay factors in the opinion,
due to the court’s language that “the district court’s ultimate decision to dissolve the injunction was
not an abuse of discretion,” id., the authors determined that this case should be categorized as an
affirmance of an injunction denial.
262. Hypoxico, 608 F. App’x 946; Tyco Healthcare, 579 F. App’x 1005.
263. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1192 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
264. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006)).
265. Id.
266. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008); MPT, Inc. v.
Marathon Labels, Inc., 258 F. App’x 318, 319 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
267. 258 F. App’x 318 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
268. Id. at 320.
269. 512 F.3d 1363, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
270. Id. at 1380 (“The reasonable royalties awarded to Innogenetics include an upfront entry fee
that contemplates or is based upon future sales by Abbott in a long term market. When a patentee
requests and receives such compensation, it cannot be heard to complain that it will be irreparably
harmed by future sales. Moreover, this factor greatly outweighs the other eBay factors in this case.
As a result, the district court’s grant of an injunction prohibiting future sales of Abbott’s genotyping
assay kits was an abuse of discretion and must be vacated.”).
271. 694 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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court held that the district court clearly erred in finding for the patentee
on the first three eBay factors.272
B.

Implications

This study’s findings have several implications for both participants and
policy makers in the patent system. The most important finding is that the
Federal Circuit appears to be more favorable to patentees than the trial
courts when it comes to awarding injunctive relief. Patentees that receive a
permanent injunction at the district court are almost always affirmed on the
merits on appeal, while patentees that lose on a permanent injunction
motion received a favorable decision only about half the time (i.e., reversed,
vacated, and/or remanded). In other words, the Federal Circuit appears
inclined toward awarding injunctions—a property-rule remedy against
future infringement—when a patent is found to be infringed and not invalid.
Notably, this finding suggests that the Federal Circuit is attempting to
correct ex post the district courts’ efforts to limit the availability of
injunctive relief post-eBay. Numerous scholars, including us, have
previously critiqued district courts’ application of eBay, arguing that they
have effectively interpreted the decision to create de facto rules denying
injunctive relief to certain categories of patentees like non-competitors and
non-practicing entities.273 By generally affirming decisions where injunctive
relief was granted while overturning around half of decisions where
injunctions were denied, the Federal Circuit appears to be sending a clear
272. Id. at 1342.
273. See, e.g., Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 99, at 244–45 (“The Supreme Court’s eBay
opinion specifically indicated that courts should not adopt a ‘categorical rule’ denying injunctions
for nonpracticing entities . . . . Nonetheless, commentators have reported that district courts’ actual
practice appears substantially to conform to the forbidden rule. If true, the practical result of the
lower courts’ application of eBay is an approach to injunctive relief that systematically disfavors
patentees who lack the resources to commercialize their processes or products directly or
immediately.” (footnotes omitted)); Holte, supra note 9, at 719–23 (explaining how district courts’
application of eBay and reliance of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence have “greatly diminished” the
availability of injunctive relief, particularly for non-practicing entities) ; Seaman, supra note 5, at
1953 (contending that “district courts appear to have adopted a de facto rule against injunctive relief
for [patent assertion entities] and other patent owners who do not directly compete in a product
market against an infringer”); Venkatesan, supra note 133, at 30 (“District courts have almost
without exception divided patentees into two camps—those who sell or manufacture products and
compete against the infringers, and those who have not commercialized their inventions and seek to
earn revenues from licensing. The former have generally been granted injunctions, whereas
nonpracticing patentees have generally been denied.”); cf. Jeremy Mulder, The Aftermath of eBay:
Predicting When District Courts Will Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 67, 81–82 (2007) (noting that “post-eBay courts view the patentee as entitled to an
injunction to protect its patented invention from direct competition,” but that “the other side of this
normative view leaves indirect competition beyond the reach of equitable remedy”).
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signal that district courts should be more expansive in awarding injunctive
relief.
In particular, the Federal Circuit appears to be more willing to entertain
requests by non-practicing entities for a permanent injunction than district
courts. As explained, previous empirical studies found that district courts
rarely grant injunctive relief to PAEs.274 Although the number of cases
where the Federal Circuit reached a merits decision on injunctive relief
involving a PAE was small, it is notable that the Federal Circuit ruled in
favor of the PAE in two of these three cases.275 Indeed, the Federal Circuit
has held that the patentee’s failure to practice the asserted patent does not
necessarily bar it from obtaining permanent injunctive relief.276
Another consequence of the Federal Circuit’s preference for injunctive
relief may be an increase in the aggregate value of patents. Backed by an
injunction, a patent owner can exclude others from practicing the patented
technology—under the penalty of contempt of court277—unless the infringer
is willing to pay a licensing fee that the patent owner accepts as sufficient
compensation for its loss of exclusivity.278 As the Federal Circuit noted in
its 2005 decision in eBay, “[i]f the injunction gives the patentee additional
leverage in licensing, that is a natural consequence of the right to
274. See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text (finding that PAEs received injunctions only
16% of the time from district courts); Chien & Lemley, supra note 6, at 10 (finding that PAEs
receive injunctions only 7% of the time when contested).
275. See Whitserve LLC v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating and
remanding the district court’s decision denying an injunction to a PAE); i4i Ltd. P’ship. v.
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s grant of an injunction
to a PAE). In the third case, the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s denial of an
injunction to a PAE without discussion. Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., LLC v. WorldPort Comm’cns,
Inc., 302 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
276. See, e.g., Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (overturning denial of permanent injunction despite the fact that the patentee did
not practice the patent-in-suit, noting “[d]irect competition in the same market is certainly one factor
suggesting strongly the potential for irreparable harm”); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543
F.3d 683, 702–03 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming permanent injunction where Broadcom sold indirectly
competing, non-practicing product, supporting showing of irreparable harm); cf. Trebro Mfg., Inc.
v. Firefly Equipment, LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that the district court
erred in denying a preliminary injunction, despite the fact that “[the patentee] does not presently
practice the patent”); High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d
1551, 1556–57 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction due to “lack of
commercial activity by the patentee,” but noting “a patentee’s failure to practice an invention does
not necessarily defeat the patentee’s claim of irreparable harm”).
277. See, e.g., TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
278. See David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L.
REV. 79, 157 (2014) (explaining that “injunctive relief requires an infringer wishing to remove the
right of the patent owner to exclude the infringer from using the patented technology to buy that
right from the patent owner in a . . . voluntary transaction at the subjective price agreed to by the
patent owner”).
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exclude.”279 As a result, an injunction can give the “patentee a very
powerful bargaining chip in licensing and settlement negotiations.”280 In
sum, the Federal Circuit’s apparent inclination toward injunctive relief—
and thus more valuable patent rights—lends supports to the claim that the
Federal Circuit has used its position as the primary appellate court over
patent claims to shape the law in a pro-patentee direction.281
There appears to be, however, one notable exception to the Federal
Circuit’s apparent preference for injunctive relief: medical device cases. As
previously explained, the district court affirmed injunction denials in 4 of 9
cases that involved a patent covering a medical device.282 This may be due
to the final eBay factor, whether the public interest would be disserved by
an injunction; courts appear sensitive to concerns about potential adverse
impacts on patients if an infringing device is enjoined without an available
adequate substitute.283 However, loss of the right to exclude via an
injunction may dampen incentives to innovate in the medical device
industry, as it may lower patent value in a field where the costs of
developing and bringing a product to market are high due to the FDA’s
extensive testing requirements.284
Finally, our study finds that stays are relatively under-utilized; they are
granted only about one-quarter of the time when an injunction is
imposed.285 Stays and other forms of delaying injunctive relief, such as
“sunset” periods that allow for infringing sales to continue for a fixed period
279. MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 547 U.S.
388 (2006).
280. Lily Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies Restructured, 25 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 787, 792 (2009).
281. See supra note 121 and sources cited therein.
282. See supra notes 257, 262–65 and accompanying text.
283. See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (acknowledging
that in some cases “the public interest factor may so strongly weigh against enjoining the infringer
that an injunction would be inappropriate”); Seaman, supra note 5, at 1999 n.311 and cases cited
therein (noting that “several district court decisions have declined to award injunctive relief on the
basis that it would disserve the public interest to restrict doctors’ and patients’ access to the
infringing [medical] devices”).
284. See Ronald J. Schutz & Patrick M. Arenz, Non-Practicing Entities and Permanent
Injunctions Post-eBay, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 203, 209 (2011) (explaining that while the public
interest factor “is often most relevant in medical devices directly affecting health, a broader point
can be made [that] ongoing royalties—as opposed to injunctions—reduce innovation further” in this
industry); Laura Masterson, Note, The Future of Medical Device Patents: Categorical Exclusion
After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 274, 298 (2014) (explaining
that “[t]he grant of a limited monopoly allows pioneer medical device firms to obtain financing
required for the tremendous expense associated with research and development, clinical trials, and
the expensive [premarket approval] process”).
285. See supra section III.A.3.
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of time, could be more widely used to avoid the alleged “holdup” costs
associated with injunctions.286 Litigants and courts should consider delaying
implementation of injunctive relief in situations where it would permit the
accused infringer to timely implement a design around,287 usually
contingent upon paying an ongoing royalty during the period before the
injunction becomes effective.288 However, stays and other time-based
delays of injunctive relief should not result in an extended postponement
that would lead to an effective loss of the patentee’s right to exclude.289 The
appropriateness of a stay would, of course, depend on the individual
circumstances of each case.
CONCLUSION
The findings from this empirical study indicate that the Federal
Circuit is generally more favorable to prevailing patentees regarding
permanent injunctive relief than the district courts following eBay.
District courts that grant an injunction after a finding of liability are
highly likely to be affirmed on appeal, whereas district courts that deny
an injunction have a significantly lower affirmance rate. This suggests
that the Federal Circuit is generally inclined toward a property rule
rather than a liability rule as a remedy against future patent infringement.
It also appears to lend support to claims by scholars and others that the
Federal Circuit, as a specialized court with a large number of patent
cases, is more pro-patentee than the generalist district courts.

286. See supra note 90 and sources cited therein (describing the holdup problem).
287. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 90, at 2038 (contending that “[i]f the infringing firm
claims that it can design around the patent, the court should issue a stay of its permanent injunction
that is long enough to permit the infringing firm to complete the redesign, if there is one, in an
efficient and timely manner”).
288. See, e.g., ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., Nos. 2011–1538, –1567,
2012–1129, –1201, 2012 WL 10716768, at *1–2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 2, 2012) (granting a stay of a
permanent injunction for a six-month “sunset” period, contingent upon the accused infringer posting
a bond for the payment of “sunset royalties that became due during the sunset period”);
MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Rexam PLC, No. 1:10–CV–511, 2012 WL 2153165, at *6 (E.D. Va. June
12, 2012) (“When an injunction includes a sunset provision, courts may set a royalty rate for that
period.”).
289. Cf. Denicolò et al., supra note 205, at 596 (contending that routine granting of stays of
permanent injunctions “whenever it is very costly or even impossible to design [around] the product
in a non-infringing way . . . would penalize the most valuable patents—precisely, those that are the
most difficult to circumvent even with full knowledge of the patent”).
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APPENDIX A: TABLE OF CASES
Plaintiff

Defendant

Briese Lichttechnik
Verttriebs GmbH
XpertUniverse, Inc.
TransPerfect Global,
Inc.
Global Traffic Techs.,
LLC
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co.
CardSoft, Inc.

Langton

Fed. Cir. Citation
Docket
2014-1253 589 F. App’x 536

Cisco Sys., Inc.
MotionPoint Corp.

2014-1328 597 F. App’x 630
2015-1165 N/A

Emtrac Sys, Inc.

2014-1537 2015 WL 3513416

Mylan Pharms., Inc.

2014-1141 N/A

VeriFone Holdings,
Inc.
Kohler Co.
Zimmer Inc.
Interlace Med., Inc.
ION Geophysical
Corp.
Pulse Elecs., Inc.
The Ohio Willow
Wood Co.
Apotex Inc. et al.
Cencom, Inc.

2014-1135 769 F.3d 1114

WBIP, LLC
Stryker Corp.
Smith & Nephew, Inc.
WesternGeco L.L.C.
Halo Elecs., Inc.
Alps South, LLC
Allergan, Inc.
Unicom Monitoring,
LLC
In re Armodafinil
Patent Litig.
Tyco Healthcare
Group LP
VirnetX Inc.
Brocade Commc’ns
Sys. Inc.
Apple, Inc.
E2Interactive, Inc.
Graphic Packaging
Intern., Inc.
Coloplast A/S

2015-1038
2013-1668
N/A
2013-1527

2016 WL 3902668
782 F.3d 649
N/A
791 F.3d 1340

2013-1472 769 F.3d 1371
2013-1452 787 F.3d 1379
2013-1245 754 F.3d 952
N/A
N/A
2013-1360 N/A

Ethicon EndoSurgery Inc.
Apple Inc.
A10 Networks, Inc.

2013-1324 774 F.3d 968

Samsung Elecs. Co.,
Ltd.
Blackhawk
Network, LLC
C.W. Zumbiel Co.

2013-1129 735 F.3d 1352

Generic Med.
Devices, Inc.

N/A

2013-1489 767 F.3d 1308
2013-1210 N/A

2013-1151 561 F. App’x 895
2012-1672 N/A
N/A
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Plaintiff

Defendant

Carl Zeiss Vision Int’l
GmbH
Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc.
Integrated Tech. Corp.
Pfizer Inc.

Signet Armorlite,
Inc.
Sandoz, Inc.

Valeant Int’l
Gen. Elec. Co.
Fractus, S.A.
Motorola, Inc.
Apple, Inc.
St. Jude Med. Inc.
Research Found. of
State Univ. of NY
Schering Corp.
Layne Christensen Co.

Hospira, Inc.
Meadwestvaco Corp.
Broadcom Corp.
Medtronic Sofamor
Danek USA, Inc.,
Conceptus, Inc.
Accentra, Inc.
Eli Lilly and Company
ActiveVideo
Networks, Inc.
Hurricane Shooters,
LLC
The Paw Wash LLC
Sanofi-Aventis
Deutschland GmbH

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

Fed. Cir.
Docket
N/A

[Vol. 92:145
Citation
N/A

2012-1567 723 F.3d 1363

Rudolph Techs., Inc.
Teva Pharms.
U.S.A., Inc.
Watson Pharms.,
Inc.
Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus. Ltd.
Samsung Elecs. Co.,
Ltd.
Apple, Inc.
Motorola, Inc.
Access Closure Inc.
Mylan Pharm.

2012-1593 734 F.3d 1352
2012-1576 555 F. App’x 961

Mylan Pharm.
Bro-Tech Corp.
d/b/a The Purolite
Co.
Sandoz Int’l GmbH
Rexam PLC
Emulex Corp.
Nuvasive, Inc.

2012-1434 496 F. App’x 87
2012-1178 N/A

Hologic, Inc.

2012-1209 2012 WL
10242277
2012-1237 500 Fed App’x 922
N/A
N/A
2011-1538 694 F.3d 1312

Staples, Inc.
Actavis
Verizon
Communications,
Inc.
EMI Yoshi Inc.
Paw Plunger LLC
Glenmark Pharms.,
Inc. USA

2012-1117 534 F. App’x 999
2013-1500 N/A
2012-1633 N/A
2012-1548
2012-1549
2012-1452
2012-1523

2012-1426
2012-1518
2012-1309
2013-1576

N/A

757 F.3d 1286
757 F.3d 1286
729 F.3d 1369
531 F. App’x 1008

N/A
731 F.3d 1258
732 F.3d 1325
778 F.3d 1365

N/A

2012-1240 494 F. App’x 93
2012-1489 748 F.3d 1354
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Versata Software Inc.
Lighting Ballast
Control LLC
Belden Tech. Inc.

SAP Am., Inc.
Philips Elecs. N.
Am. Corp.
Superior Essex
Communications LP
Envtl. Mfg.
Solutions, LLC
Par Pharma. Inc.
Otis Elevator Co.
Aurora Performance
MEMC Elec.
Materials, Inc.
Whirlpool Corp.
Powerscreen Int’l
Distrib. Ltd.
Lawson Software,
Inc.
Envisiontec, Inc.
Terumo Corp.

Peach State Labs, Inc.
Pozen Inc.
Inventio AG
Midtronics Inc.
Soitec
LG Elecs. USA Inc
Metso Minerals Inc.
ePlus, Inc.
3D Sys., Inc.
B. Braun Melsungen
AG
WhitServe LLC
Douglas Dynamics,
LLC
Harris Corp.
Affinity Labs of Texas
LLC
K-Tec
Ernie Ball Inc.
Brigham and
Women’s Hospital,
Inc.
Bendix Comm. Veh.
Sys. Inc.
Otsuka Pharm.
Robert Bosch, LLC
Stone Strong, LLC

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

Computer Packages,
Inc.
Buyers Prods. Co.

205

Fed. Cir. Citation
Docket
2012-1029 717 F.3d 1255
2012-1014 498 F. App’x 986
2011-1608 N/A
N/A

N/A

2011-1584
2009-1146
2011-1589
2011-1534

696 F.3d 1151
593 F.3d 1275
475 F. App’x 764
N/A

N/A
N/A
2011-1572 526 F. App’x 988
2011-1396 700 F.3d 509
2011-1340 426 F. App’x 914
2011-1400 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6086
2011-1206 694 F.3d 10
2011-1291 717 F.3d 1336

Fed. Express Corp.
BMW N. Am., LLC

2012-1094 502 F. App’x 957
2011-1350 N/A

Vita-Mix
Earvana
Teva Pharms.

2011-1244 696 F.3d 1364
2012-1276 502 F. App’x 971
2011-1217 457 F. App’x 927

Haldex Brake Prods.
Corp.
Sandoz, Inc.
Pylon Mfg. Co.
Delzotto Prods. of
Fla., Inc.

2011-1323 461 F. App’x 932
2011-1126 678 F.3d 1280
2011-1096 659 F.3d 1142
2011-1156 455 F. App’x 964
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Plaintiff

Defendant

Streck, Inc.

Research &
Diagnostic Sys., Inc.
Beyond Innovation
Tech. Co.
Sercel, Inc.

O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd.
Input/Output, Inc.
(ION)
Marine Polymer
Techs., Inc.
ReedHycalog UK,
Ltd.
ClearValue, Inc.
Soverain Software
LLC
Retractable Techs.,
Inc.
Alcon, Inc.
In re Alfuzosin
Hydrochloride Patent
Litig.
Dow Chem. Corp.
Custom Designs of
Nashville Inc.
Cordance Corp.
Woods
Mitsubushi Chem.
Corp.
LaserDynamics Inc
Smith & Nephew Inc.
Richter
Retractable Techs.,
Inc.
Tyco Healthcare
Group LP
Parker-Hannifin Corp.

4/5/2017 2:20 PM
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Fed. Cir. Citation
Docket
2011-1044 665 F.3d 1269
2011-1054 449 F. App’x 923
2011-1255 419 F. App’x 988

HemCon Inc.

2010-1548 672 F.3d 1350

Diamond
Innovations Inc
Pearl River
Polymers, Inc.
Newegg, Inc.

2011-1010 456 F. App’x 886

Occupational &
Med. Innovations,
Ltd. (OMI)
Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc.

N/A

2011-1078 668 F.3d 1340
2011-1009 705 F.3d 1333
N/A

2010-1097 N/A
N/A

N/A

Nova Chems. Corp.
Alsa Corp.

2010-1526 803 F.3d 620
N/A
N/A

Amazon.com, Inc.
Deangelo Marine
Exhaust, Inc.
Barr Laboratories

2010-1502 658 F.3d 1330
2010-1478 692 F.3d 1272

Quanta Computer,
Inc
Arthrex, Inc.
Supa Tech.
Becton, Dickinson
& Co.
Applied Medical
Resources Group
Wix Filtration Corp.

2011-1440 694 F.3d 51

2010-1432 435 F. App’x 927

2010-1427 453 F. App’x 977
N/A
N/A
2010-1402 653 F.3d 1296
2013-1624 579 F. App’x 1005
2011-1347 N/A
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Plaintiff

Defendant

Humanscale Corp.
Johnson & Johnson
Vision Care
Ricoh Co.

CompX Int’l Inc.
CIBA Vision Corp.

Presidio Components
Judkins
Eli Lilly & Co.
Arlington Indus. Inc.
Mytee Prods., Inc.
Emcore Corp.
Innovention Toys,
LLC
I-Flow Corp.
IGT
Creative Internet
Advertising Corp.
Japan Cash Machine
Co.
Cummins-Allison
Corp.
Monsanto Co.
The Western Union
Co.
Eli Lilly & Co.
Flexiteek Ams., Inc.
Spectralytics Inc.
Unigene Laboratories,
Inc.
August Tech. Corp.
Merck Sharp &
Dohme Pharm. SRL

4/5/2017 2:20 PM
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Fed. Cir. Citation
Docket
2010-1549 457 F. App’x 921
2010-1372 N/A

Quanta Computer
Inc.
Amer. Tech.
Ceramics
HT Window
Fashions Corp.
Sicor Pharms, Inc.
Bridgeport Fittings,
Inc.
Harris Research,
Inc.
Optium Corp.
MGA Entm’t, Inc.

2010-1332 N/A

Apex Med. Tech.,
Inc
Bally Gaming Int’l
Inc.
Yahoo Inc.

N/A

MEI, Inc.

2010-1069 400 F. App’x 563

SBM Co., Ltd.

2011-1049 484 F. App’x 499

Bowman
Moneygram
International
Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc.
PlasTEAK, Inc.
Cordis Corp.
Apotex Inc. et al.

2010-1068 657 F.3d 1341
2010-1080 626 F.3d 1361

Camtek Ltd.
Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc.

2010-1458 655 F.3d 1278
2010-1009 N/A

2010-1355 702 F.3d 1351
2010-1336 416 F. App’x 903
2010-1342 426 F. App’x 892
2010-1377 477 F. App’x 740
2010-1207 439 F. App’x 882
2010-1258 408 F. App’x 355
2010-1290 637 F.3d 1314
N/A

2010-1364 659 F.3d 1109
2010-1215 476 F. App’x 724

2009-1071 619 F.3d 1329
2009-1501 400 F. App’x 559
2009-1564 649 F.3d 1336
2010-1006 655 F.3d 1352
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Plaintiff

Defendant

Finjan Software Ltd.

Secure Computing
Corp.
Microsoft Corp.
Mylan Pharms.
Globus Med., Inc.

i4i LP
Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd.
Medtronic Sofamor
Danek USA, Inc.,
iLight Techs., Inc.
Transamerica Life Ins.
Co.
Haemonetics Corp.
Hypoxico Inc.
Koninklijke Philips
Elecs. NV
Mass Eng’d Design,
Inc.
Bard Peripheral
Vascular
Kowalski
Joyal Prods., Inc.
Hynix Semiconductor,
Inc.
Global Traffic Techs.
LLC
U.S. Philips Corp.
Ariba Inc.
Telcordia Techs., Inc.
Funai Elec. Co., Ltd.
Sensormatic Elec.
Corp.
Vertical Doors Inc.
Power Integrations,
Inc.

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

[Vol. 92:145

Fed. Cir. Citation
Docket
2009-1576 626 F.3d 1197
2009-1504 598 F.3d 831
2009-1511 619 F.3d 1346
2009-1525 416 F. App’x 67

Fallon Luminous
Prods. Corp.
Lincoln Nat’l Life
Ins. Co.
Baxter Healthcare
Corp.
Colorado Altitude
Training
Power Media CD
Tek, Inc.
Ergotron, Inc.

2009-1342 375 F. App’x 21

W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc
Mommy Gina Tuna
Resources
Johnson Elec. N.
Am., Inc.
Rambus Inc.

2010-1510 670 F.3d 1171

Tomar Elecs., Inc

2009-1220 356 F. App’x 383

Iwasaki Elec. Co
Emptoris Inc.
Cisco Sys., Inc.
Daewoo Elecs.
Corp.
The Tag Co.

2009-1252
2009-1230
2009-1175
2009-1225

J.T. Bonn Inc.
Fairchild
Semiconductor
Intern.

2009-1414 449 F. App’x 17
2009-1169 345 F. App’x 563

2009-1403 609 F.3d 1364
2009-1557 607 F.3d 776
2014-1544 608 F. App’x 946
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2009-1332 366 F. App’x 149
2009-1095 335 F. App’x 48
2009-1299 645 F.3d 1336

449 F. App’x 1
2010 WL 55625
612 F.3d 1365
616 F.3d 1357

2009-1193 367 F. App’x 143
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Plaintiff

Defendant

Smith & Nephew Inc.
American Calcar Inc.

Arthrex Inc.
American Honda
Motor Co.
Acushnet Co.
Smart Sys. Techs,
Inc.
Tyco Healthcare
Enterasys Networks,
Inc.
Medtronic Vascular,
Inc.

Callaway Golf Co.
Cam Guard Sys., Inc.
Becton Dickinson Co.
Extreme Networks,
Inc.
Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys.,
Inc.
Gemtron Corp.
Pressure Prods. Med.
Supplies Inc.
TruePosition, Inc.
Emory Univ.
Anascape, Ltd.
Grantley Patent
Holding, Ltd.
Trading Tech. Int’l
Kowalski
Power-One, Inc.
Fresenius USA, Inc.
Chase Med., L.P.
Ecolab, Inc.
Orion IP, LLC
Avid Identification
Sys.
Blackboard Inc.
Amgen
Cygnus
Telecommunications
Tech., LLC
ResQNet.com, Inc.

4/5/2017 2:20 PM
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Fed. Cir. Citation
Docket
2009-1091 355 F. App’x 384
2009-1503 651 F.3d 1318
2009-1076 576 F.3d 1331
N/A
N/A
2009-1053 616 F.3d 1249
2009-1325 395 F. App’x 709
2009-1014 356 Fed App’x 389

Saint-Gobain Corp.
Quan Emerteq Corp.

2009-1001 572 F.3d 1371
2008-1602 599 F.3d 1308

Andrew Corp.
Nova Biogentics
Nintendo of Am.
Clear Channel
Communications,
Inc.
eSpeed
Ocean Duke Corp.
Artesyn Techs., Inc.
(Emerson)
Baxter Int’l Inc.
CHF Techs., Inc.
FMC Corp.
Mercedes-Benz
USA
Philips Elecs. N.
Am. Corp.
Desire2Learn Inc.
F. HoffmanLaRoche Ltd.
WorldPort
Communications

2009-1389
N/A
2008-1500
2008-1508

Lansa, Inc.

2008-1365 594 F.3d 860

389 F. App’x 1000
N/A
601 F.3d 1333
329 F. App’x 266

2008-1392 595 F.3d 1340
2008-1364 316 F. App’x 986
2008-1501 599 F.3d 1343
2008-1306
2008-1335
2008-1228
2009-1130

582 F.3d 1288
311 F. App’x 343
569 F.3d 1335
605 F.3d 967

2009-1216 603 F.3d 967
2008-1368 574 F.3d 1371
2009-1020 580 F.3d 1340
2008-1351 302 F. App’x 921
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Plaintiff

Defendant

Respironics, Inc.
Broadcom Corp.
DePuy Spine, Inc.

Invacare Corp.
Qualcomm, Inc.
Medtronic Sofamor
DA
Ultra Clean Holding
Inc.
Stryker Corp.
Nutrinova, Inc.

Celerity, Inc.
Acumed, LLC
Martek Biosciences
Corp.
Sundance, Inc.
Koninklijke Philips
Elecs. NV
Baden Sports, Inc.
Telecomm. Sys, Inc.
Allan Block Corp.
Johns Hopkins Univ.
Muniauction, Inc.
MercExchange, LLC
Diomed, Inc.
Sanofi-Synthelabo
Commonwealth Sci. &
Indus. Res. Org.
(CSIRO)
Brooktrout, Inc.
Heuft Systemtechnik
GmbH
Lexion Med Inc.
Informatica Corp.

Proveris Scientific
Corp.
MGM Well Servs.,
Inc.

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

Fed. Cir.
Docket
2008-1164
2008-1199
2008-1240

[Vol. 92:145
Citation
303 F. App’x 865
543 F.3d 683
567 F.3d 1314

2008-1205 296 F. App’x 45
2008-1124 551 F.3d 1323
2008-1459 579 F.3d 1363

DeMonte
Fabricating Ltd.
Int’l Disc Mfrs.

2008-1068 550 F.3d 1356

Kabushiki Kaisha
Molten
Mobile 365, Inc.
E. Dillon & Co.
Datascope Corp.
Thomson Corp.
eBay, Inc.
Angiodynamics, Inc.
Apotex, Inc.
Buffalo Tech.
(USA), Inc.

2008-1216 556 F.3d 1300

Eicon Networks
Corp.
Indus. Dynamics
Co.
Northgate Techs.
Inc.
Business Objects
Data Integration,
Inc.
Innovasystems, Inc.

2006-1288 253 F. App’x 25

Mega Lift Sys., LLC

2007-1367 264 F. App’x 900

N/A

2009-1348
2008-1014
2007-1530
2007-1485
2007-1531
2007-1475
2007-1438
2007-1449

N/A

363 F. App’x 743
287 F. App’x 109
543 F.3d 1342
532 F.3d 1318
273 F. App’x 857
310 F. App’x 366
550 F.3d 1075
542 F.3d 1363

2007-1417 282 F. App’x 836
2007-1420 292 F. App’x 42
2008-1123 299 F. App’x 965

2007-1428 536 F.3d 1256
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Plaintiff

Defendant

800 Adept, Inc.

Murex Securities,
Ltd.
ATMI, Inc.
Beyond Innovation
Tech. Co.
Mylan Labs Inc.

Praxair, Inc.
O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd.
Ortho-McNeil Pharm.,
Inc.
Amado
Verizon Servs. Corp.
Atlanta Attachment
Co.
Momentus Golf, Inc.
Novozymes A/S
Genlyte Thomas
Group LLC
MPT, Inc.
Exergen Corp.
Innogenetics, N.V.
IMX, Inc
Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling,
Inc.
Visto Corp.
Cybersettle, Inc.
Black & Decker Inc.
Color Kinetics, Inc.
Omegaflex, Inc.
Janssen Pharm.
Rosco, Inc.
Smith & Nephew, Inc.

4/5/2017 2:20 PM
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Docket
2007-1272 539 F.3d 1354
2007-1483 543 F.3d 1306
2007-1302 521 F.3d 1351
2007-1223 520 F.3d 1358

Microsoft Corp.
Vonage Holdings
Corp.
Leggett & Platt, Inc.

2007-1236 517 F.3d 1353
2007-1240 503 F.3d 1295

Swingrite Golf
Corp.
Genencor Int’l, Inc.
Arch. Lighting
Group
Marathon Labels,
Inc.
CVS Corp.
Abbott Labs.
LendingTree, Inc.
GlobalSantaFe
Corp.

N/A

Seven Networks,
Inc.
Nat’l Arbitration
Forum, Inc.
Robert Bosch Tool
Corp.
Super Vision Int’l,
Inc.
Parker Hannifin
Corp.
Dr. Reddy’s
Laboratories
Mirror Lite Co.
Synthes (U.S.A.)

2007-1155 N/A

2007-1188 516 F.3d 1361
N/A

N/A
N/A
2007-1405 278 F. App’x 1004
2007-1183 258 F. App’x 318
2006-1491
2007-1145
2007-1175
N/A

575 F.3d 1312
512 F.3d 1363
327 F. App’x 199
N/A

2007-1092 243 F. App’x 603
2007-1243 260 F. App’x 284
N/A

N/A

2007-1044 243 F. App’x 592
2007-1021 223 F. App’x 999
2010-1086 394 Fed. App’x 714
2007-1048 269 F. App’x 972
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Plaintiff

Defendant

3M Innovative
Properties Co.
Int’l Rectifier
Voda
Finisar Corp.
Pods, Inc.
Litecubes, LLC

Avery Dennison
Corp.
IXYS Corp.
Cordis Corp.
DirecTV Group Inc.
Porta Stor, Inc.
Northern Light
Prods., Inc.
Echostar (Dish
Network)
Toyota Motor Corp.
Loggans
Mudhopper Oilfield
Servs., Inc.
Microsoft Corp.
CoreValve, Inc.

TiVo
Paice LLC
Brinton
Wald
z4
Edwards Lifesciences
AG

4/5/2017 2:20 PM

[Vol. 92:145

Fed. Cir. Citation
Docket
2007-1040 N/A
2007-1063
2007-1297
2007-1023
2006-1504
2006-1646

515 F.3d 1353
536 F.3d 1311
523 F.3d 1323
484 F.3d 1359
523 F.3d 1353

2006-1574 516 F.3d 1290
2006-1610 504 F.3d 1293
2006-1611 214 F. App’x 984
N/A
N/A
2006-1638 507 F.3d 1340
2011-1215 699 F.3d 1305

